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I. INTRODUCTION
The following pages assess the widely-anticipated' March 30, 2010,
opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Jones v. Harris Asso-
ciates L.P.2 That opinion by Justice Samuel Alito widened the door for fu-
ture litigation brought by, e.g., mutual fund shareholders challenging the fees
accorded to the investment advisers of their funds. Such investment advisers
of mutual funds typically create the funds they thereupon advise and domi-
nate-hence, captive mutual funds. The Investment Company Act of 1940,
as amended in 1970, 3 attached upon an investment adviser of a registered
investment company a fiduciary duty respecting that adviser's compensation
for services paid by such company.4 The Jones controversy reached the Su-
preme Court only after its turbulent vetting in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit by such notables of the scholarly field of law
1. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Supreme Court Debates Mutual Fund Fee Charges, Bos.
GLOBE, Nov. 03, 2009, at A12. The controversy was one of the October 2009 term's "most
closely watched business cases." David G. Savage, Justices: Funds Can Be Sued Over Fees,
CHI.TRIB., Mar. 31, 2010, at § 1, 19. The March 9, 2009 grant of a petition for writ of certi-
orari, 129 S. Ct. 1579 (2009), had, alone, set abuzz the mutual fund industry because poten-
tially presaging revisions of fees charged to manage money. Tom Sullivan, Money-Market
Fund to Get More Safeguards, BARRON'S, Mar. 23, 2009, at 44. This case proved to be the
initial mutual fund-related case which the Supreme Court had heard in eighteen years. Sam
Mamudi, Decision Could Set Standard on Fees, WALL ST. J., Mar. 19, 2009, at C9.
2. 130S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
3. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 36(b), 84 Stat.
1413, 1428 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35b (2006)), amending Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (1940).
4. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated by 130
S. Ct. 1418 (2010). "Fund advisers owe it to their owners to make as much money as possi-
ble, which they do by collecting fees. But fund directors owe it to shareholders to keep fees."
John Waggoner, Fees Land Mutual Funds in Top Court, USA TODAY, Oct. 30, 2009, at B 1.
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and economics as the Seventh Circuit's Chief Judge Frank H. Easterbrook
and Judge Richard A. Posner.
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.,5 a 1982 opinion
out of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, so con-
strued the fiduciary duty element of the 1970 amendments to the 1940 Act
that litigation thereafter in excessive fee cases dispensed judgments virtually
uniformly for defendants. Subsequently would experts in the economic
analysis of law, Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, pronounce that nothing
special inheres in fiduciary relationships. Fiduciary duty, rather, is a func-
tion of transaction costs. In Jones, Chief Judge Easterbrook replied to an
attack under the amendments to the Investment Company Act by sharehold-
ers in captive mutual funds against their funds' investment adviser's remune-
ration. Easterbrook broke with Gartenberg in an opinion pitched almost
entirely to the element of the fiduciary-investment adviser's disclosure to its
captive mutual fund's own board. Both the appellate-level opinions in Gar-
tenberg and in Jones brushed aside plaintiff bids to benchmark the invest-
ment advisory fees charged to their captive mutual funds against fees
charged independent clients like pension funds.6 In his dissent from the
denial of rehearing en banc in Jones, Judge Posner contrariwise dwelt on the
Jones investment adviser's charging captive funds more than twice what it
charged to independent funds.7
Justice Alito's opinion tracked less the Easterbrook reasoning in Jones
than the Gartenberg path: To risk liability for breach of its fiduciary duty, an
investment adviser must collect compensation so disproportionately great as
to bear no reasonable relation to the rendered services and as cannot be an
outcome of an arm's-length bargain.8 But Alito submits a Gartenberg-plus
opinion in Jones. It expressly disavows any categorical rule forestalling
comparisons between those fees an adviser charges a captive mutual fund
and those it levies upon independent clients. Unsettlingly, perhaps, for mu-
tual fund investment advisers, economics scholarship immediately post-
Jones reported on the cost structure and performance of a large sampling of
America's pension funds. It disclosed that mutual fund fees substantially
exceed pension fund costs, possibly due in part to pension funds' greater
5. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
6. Id. at 925; Jones, 527 F.3d at 631.
7. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) (per curiam).
8. See Rob M.M.J. Bauer et al., Pension Fund Performance and Costs: Small Is Beauti-
ful (Soc. Sci. Research Networks, Working Paper, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=965388.
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sizes, which could entail enhanced bargaining power.9 The performances of
defined benefit contribution funds outdo those of defined contribution
pension funds. This suggests that monitoring external managers and invok-
ing bargaining muscle to drive down costs is more efficient in the former,
potentially due to improved incentives.1° And Alito adds that fees can be
excessive even when negotiated by a board possessing all relevant informa-
tion.
Immediately apprehended in numerous quarters was the potential thrust
of the Jones Gartenberg-plus opinion. That tendency could be pressure on
the investment advisers of captive mutual fund boards to justify in detail, and
perhaps to reduce, their investment advisory charges. This pressure would
conduce to the financial benefit of retail-not institutional-investors. Un-
fortunately, the salutary payoffs hopable from Jones had not already been
conjured for investors by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
This 2010 Jones opinion closely comports with the law and economics
propounded neither by Easterbrook-with his linkage of fiduciary duty to
transaction costs-nor by Posner, who links fiduciary duty with the unequal
information costs problem. It squares with the thought of Nobel laureate
economist Sir James A. Mirrlees, and of fiduciary law specialist Tamar
Frankel of Boston University. Mirrlees perceives the distinguishing feature
of principal-agent relationships to be asymmetry in responsibilities, with the
principal as first mover and agent as the second. Frankel teaches that first
mover-mutual fund investors (principals) can be hostages of vulpine second
mover-investment advisers (agents).
II. GARTENBERG v. MERRILL LYNCH ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC.
In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit case of
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 11 two shareholders
(Irving L. Gartenberg and Simone C. Andre) of a money market fund (Mer-
rill Lynch Ready Assets Trust) "appeal[ed] from a judgment of the Southern
District of New York."1 2 That judgment had dismissed their consolidated
derivative actions against Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust and its affiliates,
Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., the adviser and manager thereof, and
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.' 3 The principal claim on appeal
was that the fees paid by Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust to Merrill Lynch
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
12. Id. at 925.
13. Id.
[Vol. 35
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Asset Management, Inc., for varied services--encompassing investment ad-
vice and the processing of daily orders from fund shareholders-were so
disproportionately large as to represent a breach of fiduciary duty violative of
section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940.14 That provision had
been added in 1970.1
5
Section 36(b) in pertinent part provides:
For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a
registered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary
duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services, or of
payments of a material nature, paid by such registered investment
company or by the security holders thereof, to such investment ad-
viser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser. An ac-
tion may be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or
by a security holder of such registered investment company on be-
half of such company, against such investment adviser .... With
respect to any such action the following provisions shall apply:
(1) It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant
engaged in personal misconduct, and the plaintiff shall have the
burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty.
(2) In any such action approval by the board of directors of such
investment company of such compensation or payments, or of con-
tracts or other arrangements providing for such compensation or
payments, and ratification or approval of such compensation or
payments, or of contracts or other arrangements providing for such
compensation or payments, by the shareholders of such investment
company, shall be given such consideration by the court as is
deemed appropriate under all the circumstances.
6
Appellants contended that the district court had erred in its rejection of a
reasonableness standard toward determining whether Merrill Lynch Asset
Management, Inc. had executed its fiduciary duty in compliance with section
36(b).17 Additionally, they urged district court error in determining whether
14. Id. at 927; see 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006 & Supp. III 2010). "In 1960, the average
expense ratio for a mutual fund was 0.48%, whereas now it stands at more than twice that
amount at 0.98%." Chuck Jaffe, Vanguard's Bogle: Fix the Fund Industry, WALL ST. J., May
21,2010, at C9.
15. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 15(b), 84
Stat. 1413, 1424 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2006)).
16. Id. § 36(b).
17. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 927.
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there had been a fiduciary duty breach in primary reliance upon other money
market funds' management fees level, and also on the costs to Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 18 They argued that the proper test must be the
rate resultant from "arm's-length negotiations in light of the services to be
rendered."' 9
They argued further (as to such arm's-length negotiated rate) that a fee
percentage, which might have proved reasonable when Merrill Lynch Ready
Assets Trust had been newly-launched, proved unreasonable once that trust
had swelled to its then-huge size.2 ° Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.
charged the Merrill Lynch Ready Assets Trust an advisory fee hinging upon
a proportion of the Fund's net assets' daily value. 2' That fee graduated
downward as the asset total waxed.22 Director of Mutual Fund Research for
Morningstar, Russel Kinnel, acknowledged in 2010, in context of Jones, that
a higher-cost fund might correspond with a higher-quality fund.2 3 Yet Kin-
nel so stipulated solely in terms of dollars expended upon managing, and not
in terms of fees as a proportion of assets:
For example, Pimco Total Return, run by the estimable Bill Gross,
charges annual management fees of 0.25%. But because the fund,
the nation's largest, holds some $200 billion in assets, Pimco
clears about $500 million a year. Meanwhile, the middling Fede-
rated Bond charges a yearly management fee of 0.75%, which, on
$1.1 billion in assets, generates fees of $8.3 million. So, does Fe-
derated charge triple Pimco's management fee because its bond
pickers are three times better than Pimco's, or are the Federated
folks less talented, as the huge gap between Pimco's and Fede-
rated's revenues implies? I'd say it's the latter.
The fund industry says, rightly, that you can't compare the
fees of funds and separate institutional accounts because retail in-
vestors require more servicing. In many instances, however, a mu-
tual fund's management fee includes a kitchen sink's worth of oth-
er charges, such as distribution costs, that aren't used to pay in-
vestment professionals. Thus, investors and fund directors alike
are in the dark when they compare fees, both between mutual
18. Id.
19. Id. at 928.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 926.
22. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 926.
23. Russel Kinnel, Fund Fees on Trial, KIPLINGER'S PERSONAL FIN., Feb. 2010, at 50.
[Vol. 35
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funds and institutional accounts and among different mutual
funds.
24
Bear in mind that the fund management group Vanguard, alone among
the biggest fund managers, is a mutual company. 25 Thereby, that manage-
ment company belongs, itself, to the funds it manages.26 Mutual funds are
technically owned by the individual shareholders investing in them.27
All parties recognized, as had the district court, that the test essentially
was to be whether the fee schedule instituted a change beyond the ambit of
that which would have been reached-in light of all surrounding circums-
tances-via arm's-length negotiation. 28 The Gartenberg panel held that to be
guilty of a section 36(b) violation "the adviser-manager must charge a fee...
so disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the ser-
24. Id. When weighted by mutual fund assets, the average fund's expense ratio between
1951 and 2009 rose from 60% to some 87%. JOHN C. BOGLE, DON'T COUNT ON IT!:
REFLECTIONS ON INVESTMENT ILLUSIONS, CAPITALISM, "MUTUAL" FUNDS, INDEXING,
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, IDEALISM, AND HEROES 75 (2011). Fund managers arrogated to them-
selves the payoffs from the "economies of scale in managing other people's money." Id. at
150. There has been a central trio of corporate organization types in the financial services
industry: public companies, the partnership, and the mutual. Ironically, supposedly was mu-
tuality a structure finely-suited to providing common services and to the policing of self-
regulation. Such a business was the more capable of eliciting and retaining a small customer's
trust. John Kay, How Trust in Finance Was Carried Off by the Carpetbaggers, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 19, 2011, at 11.
25. John Authers, Bubbles Are the Fault of the Many - Not the Few, FIN. TIMES (London),
Apr. 3, 2010, at 16.
26. Id.
Despite the "mutual fund" label attached to US investment funds, Vanguard is the only
true mutual fund group, owned by investors in its funds. Naturally, Mr. [John] Bogle, [Van-
guard founder], regards this as the best form of ownership. He claims support in this view
from David Swensen, chief investment officer of Yale University's endowment. He quotes
Mr. Swensen: "Investors fare best with funds managed by not-for-profit organisations [sic],
because the management firm focuses exclusively on serving investor interests."
It is true in theory, but not always in practice, as investors in products managed by mu-
tual life assurance companies discovered in the UK. That Vanguard has maintained its inves-
tor focus and stuck it its core principles probably has as much to do with Mr. Bogle's strong
views as with the mutual set-up. But more mutually run institutions would not go amiss.
Mr. Bogle's prescription for a better system is relatively simple: to demand proper fidu-
ciary management from money managers. They must prioritise [sic] client interests, act as re-
sponsible corporate citizens, charge reasonable fees, and eliminate conflicts of interest.
Pauline Skypala, A Vital Remedy for Capitalism's Ills, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 10, 2011, at
6; Paul Menchaca, Big Losses Prompt Fresh Look at Investment Model, FIN. TIMES (London),
Jan. 10, 2011, at 16 ("The approach pioneered by Yale's David Swensen is under scrutiny.").
27. Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816, 820 (8th Cir. 2009), vacated by 130 S.
Ct. 2340 (2010).
28. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d Cir. 1982).
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vices rendered and could not have been the product of arm's-length bargain-
ing. ' 29
All pertinent facts were to be assessed. 30 Not pertinent was the appel-
lants' proposal that a criterion for ascertaining fair advisory fees for money
market funds (the captive funds) should be the lower fees levied by invest-
ment advisers upon large pension funds (independent clients):
The nature and extent of the services required by each type of fund
differ sharply. As the district court recognized, the pension
fund[s] do not face the myriad of daily purchases and redemptions
throughout the nation which must be handled by the Fund, in
which a purchaser may invest for only a few days.
3 1
During 2009, a panel for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit would suppose that this language constituted a Gartenberg
disclaimer against comparing money market mutual funds (apples) against
equity pension funds (oranges).32 And the Second Circuit panel concluded
that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proving that the fees le-
vied had been so extreme or unjust as to equal a breach of fiduciary duty
under section 36(b): 33
Our affirmance is not a holding that the fee contract between the
Fund and the Manager is fair and reasonable. We merely conclude
that on this record appellants failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence a breach of fiduciary duty. Whether a violation of
[section] 36(b) might be established through more probative evi-
dence of (1) the Broker's processing costs; (2) the offsetting com-
mission benefits realized by the Broker from non-Fund securities
business generated by Fund accounts; and (3) the "float" interest
income gained by the Broker from its method of handling payment
on Fund redemptions, must therefore remain a matter of specula-
tion. Indeed, the independent trustees of the Fund might well be
advised, in the interests of Fund investors, to initiate such stu-
dies. 34
Hence, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.35
29. Id.
30. Id. at 929.
31. Id. at 930 n.3.
32. Gallus, 561 F.3d at 823-24.
33. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 930.
34. Id. at 933.
35. Id. at 934.
[Vol. 35
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Passage of the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, with its
section 36(b),36 had little impact on the mutual fund industry.37 Section 36(b)
spawned numerous lawsuits, but these met with piddling success. 3s And into
2009, not only had the judiciary applied Gartenberg thinking 39 for upwards
of three decades, but the Securities and Exchange Commission had incorpo-
rated Gartenberg into its own rulemaking.40
I. INTERLUDE: EASTERBROOK AND FISCHEL ON FIDUCIARY DUTY
A seminal article on fiduciary duty in general41 is Contract and Fidu-
ciary Duty42 by Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel. Previously,
they had indicated that the duty of loyalty is a response to the impossibility
of writing a contract specifying entirely the parties' obligations.43 One con-
tracting party might "desire an objective . . . but have neither an idea nor
much concern" about how her end be attained. 44 In place of specified under-
takings, an agent shoulders a loyalty duty respecting reaching the goal, plus a
duty of care in performance. 45 An expertise-hiring principal is reluctant to
expose herself to the mercy of an agent whose inputs and outputs are difficult
to monitor.4 This demarcates the fiduciary package.47
Since Ronald H. Coase published his studies The Federal Communica-
tions Commission48 and The Problem of Social Cost49 in 1959 and 1960 re-
36. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 36(b), 84 Stat.
1413, 1429 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006)).
37. MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER'S VIEw 70 (2008).
38. Id.
39. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 933.
40. Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at Indep. Dirs.
Council's 2009 Inv. Co. Dirs. Conference (Nov. 13, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchIll309tap.htm). "In Gartenberg, the Second
Circuit analyzed § 36(b) and created the framework that has served as the starting point for
interpreting a fund adviser's fiduciary duty." Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816,
821 (8th Cir. 2009), vacated by 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010).
41. Charles W. Wolfram, A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach as Legal Malpractice,
34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 689, 712 (2006).
42. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. &
EcON. 425 (1993).
43. Id. at 426.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 426.
48. R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1959)
[hereinafter Coase, The Federal Communications Commission].
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spectively, it has been grasped that the legal rules can minimize the chal-
lenges of fragmentary information and weighty transaction costs, via pre-
scribing results contracting parties would have selected in a world of abun-
dant information and costless negotiations. 50  Transaction costs are those
costs connected with utilizing a specific governance means to conduct trans-
actions, e.g., the negotiation of, the formation of, and the monitoring of con-
tracts, and enforcing performance.51 Coase first introduced into economics
the transaction cost concept.52 Indeed, companies themselves arise when and
where hierarchies provide superior to markets. A reason therefor is the ex-
pense in delineating and overseeing specific contracts. Rather than "detailed
contracts, long-term relationships [built upon] trust need to emerge [within]
businesses, and between businesses and suppliers. 53
Fiduciary duties-Easterbrook and Fischel aver-are not a species apart
from other contractual undertakings. 54  Fiduciary obligations vary across
different underlying transactions, just as do actual contracts vary across mar-
kets.55 Undeniably, fiduciary duties substantially deviate from one agency
relationship to another: e.g., trustee/beneficiary, pension trustee/beneficiary,
guardian/ward, attorney/client, partner/partner, corporate manager/investor,
majority or inside investor/client, labor union/employee, lender/borrower,
and franchisor/franchisee. 56  On the other hand, Professor Robert Flanni-
49. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) [hereinafter
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost]. Ronald H. Coase was awarded the Alfred Nobel Me-
morial Prize in Economics in 1991. GRAHAM BANNOCK ET AL., DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
61 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1998).
50. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 426. But, Easterbrook and Fischel cite
only to the Coase article of 1960, not of 1959. See id. at 426.
51. Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, Trust and Incentives in Agency, 15
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 45, 100 n.202 (2005) (citing R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4
ECONOMICA 386, 390-92 (1937)).
52. Id.
53. Martin Wolf, Britain's Strategic Chocolate Dilemma, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 29,
2010, at 9.
When transactions are discrete and involve previously anonymous participants, contract doc-
trine reduces transaction costs by guaranteeing that the parties' reasonable expectations will be
met. By contrast, when transactions are ongoing, frequent, and involve close personal con-
tact-when they are "relational," in other words-the purpose and function of contract shift.
Because norms are more likely to provide informal enforcement mechanisms, the benefits de-
rived from ceremony and symbolism are at liberty to come to the fore.
Robert C. Illig, The Dual Nature of Private Law: Private Investment Funds, the Crash of
2008, and Why We Contract 40 (unpublished law review article), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= I 007&context--robert-illig.
54. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 427.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 432-34.
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gan-the Canadian expert on the law and economics of fiduciary duty57-
argues that Easterbrook and Fischel err in asserting that fiduciary duty
attributes so deviate among agency relationships.58 Constantly evolving is
the fiduciary principle.59
Scholars of noneconomic bent lack "a unifying approach to fiduciary
duties because they" seek something special in fiduciary relationships; but,
there is naught special-Easterbrook and Fischel aver-to be unearthed. 6°
Once transactions costs prove steep, somebody calls some contractual rela-
tions fiduciary; nevertheless, it is a continuum as Easterbrook and Fischel
allege.6' (On the other hand, Flannigan points out regarding contract and the
general law of fiduciary obligation: "There is no connection at all where
they do not overlap (open access contractual arrangements, non-contractual
fiduciary obligations). ''62) Contract law encompasses the principle of good
faith in implementation, and good faith blurs into fiduciary duties.63 For the
respective good faith, and fiduciary duty, concepts are alike a stab at approx-
57. University of Saskatchewan College of Law Professor Flannigan, awarded the S.J.D.
by the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, is the author of, inter alia, Robert Flannigan,
Fact-Based Fiduciary Accountability in Canada, 36 ADVOCS. Q. 431 (2010) [hereinafter Hlan-
nigan, Fact-Based Fiduciary Accountability in Canada]; Robert Flannigan, Fiduciary Accoun-
tability Transformed, 35 ADvOCS. Q. 334 (2009); Robert Flannigan, The Core Nature of Fidu-
ciary Accountability, 2009 N.Z. L. REV. 375; Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Duty of De-
parting Employees, 14 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 355 (2009); Robert Flannigan, The [Fiduciary]
Duty of Fidelity, 124 L. Q. REV. 274 (2008); Robert Flannigan, Fiduciary Mechanics, 14 CAN.
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 25 (2008); Robert Flannigan, Child Labour: The Partial Fiduciary Accoun-
tability of Parents, 86 CAN. B. REV. 293 (2007); Robert Flannigan, The Fiduciary Accounta-
bility of Ordinary Employees, 13 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 283 (2007); Robert Flannigan, The
Strict Character of Fiduciary Liability, 2006 N.Z. L. REV. 209; Robert Flannigan, The Adulte-
ration of Fiduciary Doctrine in Corporate Law, 122 L. Q. REV. 449 (2006); Robert Flannigan,
Director Duties: A Fiduciary Duty to Confess, 26 Bus. L. REV. 258 (2005); Robert Flannigan,
A Romantic Conception of Fiduciary Obligation, 84 CAN. B. REV. 391 (2005) (reviewing
LEONARD ROTMAN, FIDUCIARY LAW, (2005)); Robert Flannigan, The Boundaries of Fiduciary
Accountability, 83 CAN. B. REV. 35 (2004).
58. Robert Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L.
393, 421 (2007) [hereinafter Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability]. "Con-
text determines whether opportunism is actionable as a fiduciary breach." Id. at 394. "No
authorities are offered for the supposed attributes and many of those attributes are misleading
or irrelevant." Id. at 421 n.121. The 1993 article was produced by, and was responsive to,
discussions running throughout the 1980s over the suitability and relative efficacy of fiduciary
and contract/market machinery to control managerial behavior. Id. at 422.
59. See, e.g., Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor,
Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 897 (1993).
60. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 438.
61. See id.
62. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 420-21.
63. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 438.
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imating those terms parties would have negotiated had they anticipated the
circumstances engendering their dispute. 64
Homilizing language in judicial opinions must not divert anyone 65 from
the hypothetical bargain insight.66 True, the remedy for violation of the fidu-
ciary duty of loyalty-disgorgement of all profit obtained thereby-appears
distinctly anti-contractual. 67 Throughout contract law, the presumptive re-
medy is premised upon a promisee's lOSS. 68 On the other hand, today dis-
gorgement remedies likely award a "promisee only the profit net of the op-
portunity cost incurred," i.e., gross profits minus what the promisee could
have obtained chasing alternative opportunities with equal time and effort.
This is not "gross profits [minus] out-of-pocket expenses. 69 In short, if an
actual contract is made, a judge enforces it.70 If actual contracts are feasible,
then courts induce bargaining.71 If transaction costs weigh too heavily, then
judges establish presumptive rules toward maximizing the parties' joint wel-
fare.72 Contract and fiduciary duties align along a continuum.73
On the other hand, Flannigan points out that while default rules are pub-
lic goods accessible to the citizenry to cut transaction costs generally, all
default rules share this public good character. 74 The function of fiduciary
responsibility as a provision of a standard form set of terms to curtail transac-
tion costs therefore presents a generic function, connecting to default status
per se and with no specific content at any given form of legal regulation.75
So such function cannot constitute a "unique substantive rationale for fidu-
ciary accountability. 76
64. Id. at 438 n.28.
65. See id. at 439-40.
66. Id. at 438.
67. Id. at 441.
68. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 441.
69. Id. (citing E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Dis-
gorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1370-82 (1985)).
70. Id. at 446.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 446. It is especially in the last thirty or forty
years that transaction-cost economics has informed the investigation of multiple salient topics.
See, e.g., THE ELGAR COMPANION TO TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS (Peter G. Klein & Mi-
chael E. Sykuta eds., 2010).
74. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 417.
75. id.
76. Id. In any case, "[t]ransaction cost methodology [demands] the evaluation of relative
costs. Economists [still] have yet to operationalize that methodology for" fiduciary duty law.
Id. at 402-03 n.33 (citing Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. EcON.
REV. 1, 3-7 (2005)).
(Vol. 35
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And the musings of Frank H. Easterbrook over fiduciary duty would
later loom large over the Jones saga.
IV. JONES v. HARRISASSOCIATESL.P.
In a May 19, 2008" opinion for a unanimous panel, including Circuit
Judges Kanne and Evans,78 United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit Chief Justice Frank H. Easterbrook reviewed a district court conclu-
sion that Harris Associates, adviser to the Oakmark complex of mutual
funds, had not violated section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act, and
the court grant summary judgment in Harris Associates, favor.79 The Oak-
mark complex's open-end funds had grown in recent years because the net
returns thereof had surpassed the market average, and the investment advis-
er's remuneration had grown apace.8° In the Jones v. Harris Associates
L.P.8 controversy, the plaintiffs-who held shares in several Oakmark
funds, captive mutual funds-contended that Harris' investment advisory
fees were excessive.82
What Chief Judge Easterbrook styled "the main event ' 83 of the appeal
was these "plaintiffs' contention that the adviser's fees [had been] exces-
sive." 84 The district court had followed Gartenberg, concluding that Harris
"must prevail because its fees are ordinary. 85 Plaintiffs first asserted that
Gartenberg should not be heeded because the Second Circuit depends too
much upon market prices as its reasonable fees benchmark 86-for plaintiffs
averred that fees are denominated incestuously instead of via competition.
Second, plaintiffs proposed that should any market be invoked as a fee
benchmark, it is the one for advisory services to unaffiliated institutional
clients: independent clients. 87 Plaintiffs asserted that Harris, like many in-
77. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 627 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated by 130 S. Ct.
1418 (2010).
78. Id. at 629.
79. Id. (discussing Jones v. Harris Assocs. L. P., No. 04-C-8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *9
(N.D. 111. Feb. 27, 2007), vacated by 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010)).
80. Id.
81. 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008).
82. Id. at 629.
83. Id. at 630.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 631.
86. Jones, 527 F.3d at 631.
87. Id.
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vestment advisers, boasts institutional clients--e.g., pension funds--charged
the less.88
Judge Easterbrook retorted that "just as plaintiffs are skeptical of Gar-
tenberg because it relies too heavily on markets, we are skeptical about Gar-
tenberg because it relies too little on markets. '89 Essentially, Jones disap-
proved the Second Circuit's Gartenberg arm's-length negotiated rate ap-
proach:90
A fiduciary duty differs from rate regulation. A fiduciary must
make full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap
on compensation. The trustees (and in the end investors, who vote
with their feet and dollars), rather than a judge or jury, determine
how much advisory services are worth.9 1
After all, to conjure with the fiduciary duty term is to summon up the
law of trusts,92 "[a]nd the rule in trust law is straightforward: A trustee owes
an obligation of candor in negotiation, and honesty in performance, but may
negotiate in his own interest and accept what the settlor or governance insti-
tution agrees to pay., 93 On the other hand, Flannigan teaches:
[I]t is a policy assertion that opportunism is sufficiently controlled
by various markets. There is nothing intrinsically "economic"
about that argument, or, to put it another way, nothing turns on the
fact of its economic character or presentation. It is simply a policy
argument about how we might regulate opportunism.
94
Judge Easterbrook in Jones elaborates:
Things work the same way for business corporations, which
though not trusts are managed by persons who owe fiduciary du-
ties of loyalty to investors. This does not prevent them from de-
manding substantial compensation and bargaining hard to get it.
Publicly traded corporations use the same basic procedures as mu-
tual funds: A committee of independent directors sets the top
managers' compensation. No court has held that this procedure
implies judicial review for "reasonableness" of the resulting salary,
88. Id.
89. Id. at 632.
90. Jones, 527 F.3d at 632.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 242 cmt. f (2009)).
94. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 394.
[Vol. 35
14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss2/5
JONES V. HARRIS ASSOCIATES L.P.
bonus, and stock options. These are constrained by competition in
several markets-firms that pay too much to managers have
trouble raising money, because net profits available for distribution
to investors are lower, and these firms also suffer in product mar-
kets because they must charge more and consumers turn else-
where. Competitive processes are imperfect but remain superior to
a "just price" system administered by the judiciary. However
weak competition may be at weeding out errors, the judicial
process is worse-for judges can't be turned out of office or have
their salaries cut if they display poor business judgment.95
Bluntly: "Judicial price-setting does not accompany fiduciary duties. 96
Prior to the development of economic science, people searched for the "just
price" criterion.97 Only "gradually it came to be realized that there is no...
95. Jones, 527 F.3d at 632-33.
96. Id. at 633.
97. MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, POWER & MARKET: GOVERNMENT AND THE ECONOMY 168
(1970). The late Dr. Rothbard was a representative of the Austrian School of Economics, see,
e.g., JEs0s HUERTA DE SOTO, THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL: MARKET ORDER AND ENTREPRENEURIAL
CREATIVITY (2008), HANDBOOK ON CONTEMPORARY AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS (Peter J. Boettke
ed. 2010), AUSTRIAN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Mario Rizzo ed. 2010), a school of surprising
durability and importance. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 844
(1976). That school's most illustrious exponent was the late economist-jurist, Friedrich A.
Hayek, RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 287 (2003) [hereinafter
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY], recipient in 1974 of the Alfred Nobel Me-
morial Prize in Economics. BANNOCK ET AL., supra note 49, at 185.
Several meanings are attributed to the expression 'neo-Austrian economics.' For the
Bohm-Bawerkian stream of thought, represented by authors such as M. Faber and P. Bernholz,
the central problem is that of offering a coherent and up-to-date formulation of [Eugen von]
Bbhm-Bawerk's theory of capital and interest. For other economists the expression 'neo-
Austrian theory' is associated not so much with a methodology or a specific doctrine as with
an ultra-liberal ideology. For these, being neo-Austrian today means basically being in favour
of the free market. It is mainly to Fritz Machlup (1902-83), and to his interpretation of the
work and thought of von Mises, as presented in Knowledge: Its Creation, Distribution and
Economic Significance (1980-83), that we owe the diffusion of this approach-an approach
which in the last few years has received a great deal of attention from von Mises' most fervent
American follower, Murray Rothbard.
ERNESTO SCREPANTI & STEFANO ZAMAGNI, AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC
THOUGHT 389 (David Field trans., 2009).
As Friedrich Hayek might say liberalism fits the distributed knowledge of a creative so-
cial order. It does this because it gives autonomy to individuals and their own spontaneous,
changing organizations. One might take such autonomy to be the central value of liberalism,
or one might take the autonomy to be a means to other things, such as, especially, welfare. For
Adam Smith, economic liberalism is justified as a way to enhance welfare through increased
productivity. Blocking government intervention in the economy for capricious reasons makes
almost all of us better off. Decentralization of knowledge implies two fundamentally impor-
tant facts: popular ignorance and government ignorance. Given government's ignorance of
what it can actually accomplish in many realms, we must want it not to be empowered to act in
those realms.
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objectively determinable quantitative criterion of justice."98 Hence, Easter-
brook's scorn of a "just price" system administered judicially. During 2011,
practically nobody explicitly searches for the so-called just price.99 Price as
reflection of fair value is mythical.1 l° It generally is recognized that any eth-
ical attack must be one against the consumers' values; it is not to be leveled
"against the quantitative price-structure [which] the market establishes on the
basis" thereof.'01 Given a pattern of consumer preferences, the just price is
the market price. 0 2 Economics cannot be value-free. However, once subjec-
tive values have been agreed upon, specific public policies can be pursued.1
0 3
The incest protest of plaintiffs stemmed from the fact that an investment
adviser creates the mutual fund, which the adviser then dominates despite
"the statutory requirement[s] that 40% of trustees be disinterested. ' '° Over
the lifetime since the passage of the Investment Company Act of 1940, fund
directors almost never fired their fund advisers.'0 5 Hence Warren Buffett
"scoffed at fund directors" at least as early as 1993.'06 "Few mutual funds
ever change advisers, and [the Jones] plaintiffs conclud[ed] from this that the
Hayek and the Austrian [S]chool of [Elconomics might better be seen as the Austrian
school of social and political theory. The Austrian vision of distributed knowledge is consis-
tent with John Stuart Mill's grounding for his principle of liberty, that individuals have the best
knowledge of what their interests are.
RUSSELL HARDIN, How Do You KNOW?: THE ECONOMICS OF ORDINARY KNOWLEDGE 83-84
(2009) (footnotes omitted).
Future Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov's father, a physics teacher, JAY BERGMAN,
MEETING THE DEMANDS OF REASON: THE LIFE AND THOUGHT OF ANDREI SAKHAROV 8 (2009),
explained experiments to his son on the basis of scientific laws: "This was an idre fixe for
Sakharov as a physicist and later as a dissident, when he believed that political problems were
just as amenable as scientific ones to rational analysis." Id. at 10. But rational analysis in
politics, unlike physics, draws upon subjective, value-judgment premises. And are these
likewise drawn upon in legal-economic theory, see, e.g., JAMES R. HACKNEY JR., UNDER
COVER OF SCIENCE: AMERICAN LEGAL-ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY
(2006), and in economics itself? See, e.g., JULIE A. NELSON, FEMINISM, OBJECTIVITY AND
ECONOMICS (1996).
98. ROTHBARD, supra note 97, at 168-69.
99. Id. at 169.
100. See generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRICELESS: THE MYTH OF FAIR VALUE (AND
How TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT) (2010).
101. ROTHBARD, supra note 97, at 169.
102. Id.
103. R.H. Bates, Some Core Assumptions in Development Economics, in ECONOMIC
ANTHROPOLOGY: TOPICS AND THEORIES 361, 378 (Sutti Ortiz ed., 1983) (citing MICHAEL P.
TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD (1977)).
104. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated by 130 S. Ct.
1418 (2010).
105. FINK, supra note 37, at 188-89.
106. Id. at 189.
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market for advisers is not competitive."'' 7 However, Chief Judge Easter-
brook countered that a fund's investors themselves effectively fire advisers
by shifting their money elsewhere." 8 This they do once advisory fees be-
come too onerous relative to results available from alternative investment
vehicles:'09 "It won't do to reply that most investors are unsophisticated and
don't compare prices. The sophisticated investors who do shop create a
competitive pressure that protects the rest. ' 110
Does Easterbrook mean that an investment adviser as in Jones is off the
hook because sophisticated outsiders who recognize that excessive adviser
fees burden a captive mutual fund would accordingly withhold their own
potential purchases, and thereby protect incumbent investors in that particu-
lar captive mutual fund via a threatened decline in the price of that captive
mutual fund's shares? The threatened decline in share price is, presumably,
seen by Easterbrook as deterring excessive adviser fees. Assuredly, the law
of large numbers so functions in democratic voting that even if some unin-
formed voters opt for incorrect choices, there obtains but slight prospect that
the ultimate majority will opt otherwise than to a perfectly-informed majori-
ty's result.' Contrariwise, commercial comparisons cause complications,
finds Donald A. Wittman:
The law of large numbers may explain the puzzle that the Bill of
Rights protects free speech but not commercial advertising. False
political advertising may fool a minority, yet it will have no harm-
ful effect since votes for the minority will not be translated into
political power. In contrast, a business does not have to persuade a
majority of consumers, only a few, to have any sales. So the ma-
jority may want to protect a minority in the commercial arena.
112
107. Jones, 527 F.3d at 631.
108. Id. at 634.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citing Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for
Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387
(1983)).
111. DONALD A. WIrTMAN, THE MYTH OF DEMOCRATIC FAILURE: WHY POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS ARE EFFICIENT 16 (1995). Wittman's example assumes voters' errors to be
uncorrelated. Id. However, similar results are yielded by more complex models. Id. (citing
Krishna K. Ladha, Condorcet's Jury Theorem in Light of de Finetti's Theorem: Majority-
Rule Voting With Correlated Votes, 10 Soc. CHOICE & WELFARE 69 (1993); Sven Berg, Con-
dorcet's Jury Theorem, Dependency Among Jurors, 10 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 87 (1993)).
112. WITTMAN, supra note 11l, at 16-17. Again, why the difference in harmful effect
between political and commercial markets? "The reason for the difference is that consumers
get what they buy, but voters get what the majority 'buys."' POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND
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That is, a business-captive mutual fund-need not fool a majority of
consumers-potential investors that include sophisticated outsiders-to prof-
itably make its sales of sufficient fund-shares. So the majority of voters act-
ing through Congress could want to protect from harmful effects uninformed
consumers who buy shares of captive mutual funds in the commercial arena.
That voter-majority's protective shield would be section 36(b).
Flannigan points out as to fiduciary issues that a manager cannot credi-
bly argue that her opportunistic benefits prove unobjectionable because the
firm has implicitly consented thereto via accepting an opportunism dis-
count." 3 Such a discount "reflect[s] only the risk of opportunism," i.e., re-
flecting expanded monitoring costs. 114 It is not justification of actual oppor-
tunism."' The law can scarcely swallow the defense that liability is elimi-
nated because the mischief could be foreseen. 16
DEMOCRACY, supra note 97, at 192. Other differences between political and commercial
markets favor the market. According to Milton Friedman, who in 1976 was awarded the
Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, BANNOCK ET. AL., supra note 49, at 166, the latter
"is, in political terms, a system of proportional representation. Each man can vote, as it were,
for the color of tie he wants and get it; he does not have to see what color the majority wants
and then, if he is in the minority, submit." MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 15
(1962).
113. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 406.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Mana-
gerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 317-26 (1976)).
116. Id. "In the narrow sense, agency costs are the costs of opportunism and the costs of
controlling opportunism." Id. at 397 n.12. In the United Kingdom as of 2011, the ease of
giving away capital bases had actually shrunk the mutual sector among the forms of economic
organization. For large loom the intimately-connected institutional issues of governance and
of capital structure:
The public limited company is the dominant form of economic organisation because, im-
perfect though the resolution of these issues within that framework may be, they are neverthe-
less resolved. Most other organisational forms do not achieve scale or permanence because
they lack capital and often have poor governance and less effective management. Mutuals,
which may seem to offer the best solution to these questions, have frequently experienced dif-
ficulties from either overcapitalisation or undercapitalisation; and the mutual sector has shrunk
because legislation made it too easy to give capital bases away. The John Lewis Partnership,
the poster child of the sector today, survives because John Spedan Lewis, its founder, was
shrewd enough to make this virtually impossible.
John Kay, Time for the Big Society to Get Down to the Nitty-Gritty, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb.
23, 2011, at 9. Plain is the crux of the problem:
The critical governance requirement is to devise supervisory structures that include a suf-
ficiently wide enough range of stakeholders to prevent capture by any particular interest. One
common problem that hybrid organisations, including public companies, face is that they end
up run mainly for the benefit of some particular group--employees, financiers, local politi-
cians, or incumbent management.
Id. Does this special interest capture idea sound familiar?
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The unaffiliated institutional clients' fee benchmark proposal of plain-
tiffs, Chief Judge Easterbrook also swept aside:
Harris Associates charges a lower percentage of assets to other
clients, but this does not imply that it must be charging too much
to the Oakmark funds. Different clients call for different commit-
ments of time. Pension funds have low (and predictable) turnover
of assets. Mutual funds may grow or shrink quickly and must hold
some assets in high-liquidity instruments to facilitate redemptions.
That complicates an adviser's task. Joint costs likewise make it
hard to draw inferences from fee levels. Some tasks in research,
valuation, and portfolio design will have benefits for several
clients. In competition those joint costs are apportioned among
paying customers according to their elasticity of demand, not ac-
cording to any rule of equal treatment.
17
Such was the avalanche-momentum of the disclosure element in Judge
Easterbrook's opinion that, the Harris fees being unhidden from investors,
and there being no allegation "that Harris Associates pulled the wool over
the eyes of the disinterested trustees" nor hindered trustees' capacity to nego-
tiate a favorable advisory services price, the judgment of the district court
was affirmed." 8 To be sure, the Easterbrook repudiation of an arm's-length
negotiated rate standard acknowledged imaginable compensation-e.g., by a
university's board of trustees to its president-"so unusual"" 9 as a 25 to I
multiple of that paid to other presidents that a court would infer either deceit,
or abdication of responsibility.' 20 Yet no court inquires whether salaries or-
dinary among comparable institutions mark excess.'
2
'
117. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 634-35 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated by 130 S.
Ct. 1418 (2010).
118. Id.at635.
119. Id. at 632.
120. Id.
121. Id. Indubitably, Easterbrook's Pied Piper theory misled into a conclusion ignoring
the statutory text and history, and nullifying the intended statutory effect. Daniel D. Birk,
Note, Jones v. Harris Associates L.P. and the Limits of Public Choice Textualism, 104 Nw. U.
L. REV. 1587, 1589-90 (2010). "The Seventh Circuit created its own standard to throw out
the case." Associated Press, Mutual-Fund Fee Case Standard Upheld, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
31,2010, at A2.
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V. THE GHOST OF JONES WALKS
An August 8, 2008,122 per curiam opinion from the Easterbrook, Kanne,
and Evans panel announced that panel's unanimous denial of a rehearing
petition. 23 A judge in active service had called for a vote on a suggested
rehearing en banc.'24 No Seventh Circuit majority had favored such en banc
rehearing.1 5 Consequently, the rehearing petition was denied.12 6 Neverthe-
less, Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner, with whom Circuit Judges Rovner,
Wood, Williams, and Tinder joined, dissented from the denial of rehearing
en banc: 127 "Jones is the only appellate opinion noted in Westlaw as disa-
greeing with Gartenberg; there is a slew of positive citations.' ' 128 Indeed:
It's not as if Gartenberg has proved to be too hard on fund advis-
ers. "Subsequent litigation [after Gartenberg] in excessive fee
cases has resulted almost uniformly in judgments for the defen-
dants ... although there have been ... notable settlements wherein
defendants have agreed to prospective reduction in the fee sche-
dule."'
' 29
A. The Law and Economics of Executive Compensation
Posner observes that the Easterbrook panel premised its repudiation of
Gartenberg mainly upon an economic analysis ripe for reexamination. 30
Scholarship probes the law and economics of corporate governance.' 31 Dis-
sected is governance and executive compensation. 3 2 Upon the long genera-
122. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 728 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
123. Id. at 729.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Jones, 537 F.3d at 729 (Posner, J., dissenting). "Circuit Judge Ripple did not partici-
pate in the consideration or decision of this case." Id.
128. Id. at 729 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, nine opinions).
129. Id. at 730 (Posner, J., dissenting) (quoting JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1211 (3d ed. 2001)).
Gartenberg held that suits can succeed only if the fee is so high that it is outside the
range of what parties might reasonably negotiate in an arm's-length transaction (a fair transac-
tion in which buyers and sellers have no relationship with one another). In nearly three dec-
ades under this standard, no fund company has ever lost a suit over fees.
Russel Kinnel, The High Court on Fees, KIPLINGER'S PERS. FIN., June 2010, at 49.
130. Jones, 537 F.3d at 730 (Posner, J., dissenting).
131. See, e.g., THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CHANGING
PERSPECTIVES (Alessio M. Pacces ed., 2010).
132. See, e.g., GOVERNANCE AND EXECUTIVECOMPENSATION (William Forbes ed., 2011).
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tion of 1980-2010, the free enterprise system bestowed a prosperity beyond
any level hitherto seen. 133 The market encouraged innovation and dazzled
consumers with options. 34 Nevertheless, the market for chief executives
appeared dysfunctional. 135 And the latest academic research indicates that at
the margin those investing in start-ups ought to lay more weight on the busi-
ness itself than its management team.
I36
1. The Shareholders Snooze
Executives' remunerations fattened whatever the welfare or setbacks of
their companies. 137 The Posner dissent explains that indications accumulate
that "executive compensation in large, publicly-traded firms often is exces-
sive., 138 Elsewhere Posner had recounted how corporate legal theory posits
that a controlling shareholder owes a fiduciary obligation to minority share-
holders. 39 Meritorious is this theory in the case of conflict of interest emerg-
ing between the shareholder majority and the minority. 4° Such, many agree,
is the better view.141 Can a standard compensation-model explain the com-
pensation of America's corporate CEOs? 142 For they attract, on average,
approximately double the compensation of their foreign counterparts.
43
133. Michael Skapinker, Business Has Not Yet Found Its Copernicus, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don), Feb. 16, 2010, at9.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Steven N. Kaplan et al., Should Investors Bet on the Jockey or the Horse? Evidence
from the Evolution of Firms from Early Business Plans to Public Companies, 64 J. FIN. 75, 75
(2009).
137. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 61-63 (2004).
138. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) (per curiam).
139. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 445-46 (7th ed. 2007) [hereinafter
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW].
140. Id.
141. The expert on the law of fiduciary duty, Tamar Frankel, agreed on this as the view to
be preferred. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 127, 129 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
142. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 139, at 447.
143. Id. In 2009, according to Income Data Services, the chief executives of the United
Kingdom's 100 biggest companies earned eighty-one times the pay average of fulltime work-
ers. John Plender, To Avoid the Backlash, Executives Need to Act on Pay, FIN. TIMES (Lon-
don), Apr. 3, 2010, at 7. In 2008, according to the Institute for Policy Studies, U.S. top execu-
tives earned 319 times more than did America's average worker. Id.
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Yes, there is such an explanation: Stock ownership is less concentrated
in the United States than it is abroad.' 44 Shareholders diversifying their port-
folios-and able to sell their shares in liquid markets-sense slight impulse
to assess or monitor company behavior. 145  For the more money she has at
stake, the weightier the incentive a shareholder perceives to monitor the per-
formance of her firm's management. 146  And the more effective proves
shareholder monitoring (the stick), the less the call for incentive-based com-
pensation (the carrot) for a CEO. 147 In widely-held public companies, fail-
ures of corporate governance inevitably crop up. 48 It is in the United States
where traditionally corporate governance has been weak, given denial of
effective voice to shareholders and an unhealthy domination of boards by a
combined chairman/CEO. 149 Thereby could American CEO incomes grow
porkier than would prove the case in a more competitive market for corpo-
rate managers.1
50
For the burden on a major company of even gross overpayments to a
CEO falls so lightly once spread across the shareholders-supposing a dis-
persed stock ownership-that no one shareholder has any incentive to
react.' 5 And it is well-known that the strategy for the individual small inves-
144. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 139, at 447. Nevertheless, an
ownership market (wherein individuals owned over ninety percent of the stock of U.S. corpo-
rations) is eclipsed by an agency market (wherein individuals hold but a quarter of such
stock). JOHN C. BOGLE, COMMON SENSE ON MUTUAL FUNDS 352 (10th anniv. ed. 2010).
Mutual funds, endowment funds, corporate, state and local pension funds, and other funds
managed by professional investment organizations control about seventy-five percent of all
U.S. corporate stock. Id. This contrasts with only twenty percent in 1968. Id.
145. Martin Wolf of the Financial Times states:
Shareholders enjoy limited liability. As a result, the responsibility they bear for the malfeas-
ance or incompetence of management is highly circumscribed. The claim of shareholders is
solely on the residual income of the company. But, since shareholders can diversify their port-
folios with ease, their exposure to the risks generated by an individual company is far less than
the exposure of workers with finn-specific knowledge and skills. Shareholders lack the ability
to assess or monitor a company's performance. If they are able to sell their shares in liquid
markets, they do not have incentives to do so either. Failures of corporate governance in wide-
ly held public companies are, it follows, inevitable.
Wolf, supra note 53.
146. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 139, at 447.
147. Id.
148. Wolf, supra note 53.
149. Tony Jackson, West Must Harness Ingenuity to Bridge Governance Gap, FIN. TIMES
(London), Apr. 26, 2010, at 16.
150. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 139, at 447 (citing LUCIAN
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 2 (2004)).
151. Id. at448.
Obviously no economist in the great classical tradition can either regret or deny profit
maximization. And none can suppose that it is other than a deeply personal motivation, some-
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tor of investing in index mutual funds indexed to, for example, the Standard
& Poor's 500 Stock Index, has been extolled during the whole generation
past.152 That strategy's merits were sung even after the anguishing October
2007-March 2009 U.S. stock market bust. 153 Even in ideal times, successful
shareholder protests are problematic."5 4 Moreover, should someone own
personally, not through a mutual fund, one-hundred dollars of stock in each
of 500 corporations, even a CEO stuffing himself with a titanic one percent
of that enterprise's wealth costs that shareholder but a single dollar. 155 So
what happens to such a stockholder's reactive incentive?
Worse, should activist stockholders unite to rein their excessively ge-
nerous board of directors, the proximate result could be an intracorporate
succession crisis. Thereby are the intrepid shareholder-revolutionaries likely
to be out of pocket for their insurrection. In the meantime, the stockholders
in other corporations can benefit. For their own boards might witness that
stockholder uprising, and therefore cinch their own belts a bit. 156 No good
deed goes unpunished.
thing one does for oneself and not gratuitously for others. Yet the modem corporation is as-
sumed to require of its management that profit maximization be for others, for stockholders
who are both powerless and unknown. In fact, and often spectacularly in recent times, profit
maximization has come to be for those with the power of decision. Management pay, bonuses
and perquisites, golden parachutes in case of loss in a takeover struggle, are set by manage-
ment for itself.
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS IN PERSPECTIVE: A CRITICAL HISTORY 277 (1987).
And meanwhile, the so-called Keynesian Revolution appeared pass6 after the stagflation of
the 1970s in our modern, "highly organized world with which Keynesianism cannot effective-
ly contend." Id. at 281. Or is Keynesian economics salvageable? See, e.g., The RETURN TO
KEYNES 9 (Bradley W. Bateman et al. eds., 2010). Notwithstanding the enthusiasm of one or
another non-economist, see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY
313 (2010) [hereinafter POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY], for Keynesian anal-
ysis, contemporary economic thought encompasses insights from money, banking, and law
indicative that the market fully can manage the money and banking sector with neither infla-
tion nor business cycles. Cf JEStuS HUERTA DE SOTO, MONEY, BANK CREDIT, AND ECONOMIC
CYCLES 29 (Melinda A. Stroup trans., 2d ed. 2009).
152. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED
STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 358-63 (2007) (rev. and updated ed.).
153. BURTON G. MALKIEL & CHARLES D. ELLIS, THE ELEMENTS OF INVESTING 34-37
(2010).
154. TIM HARFORD, THE LOGIC OF LIFE: THE RATIONAL ECONOMICS OF AN IRRATIONAL
WORLD 107 (2008).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 108. Sure enough, mutual funds investing in corporate stock seemingly under-
stand that stockholder activism to rein in an excessively generous board can backfire. For
under the "Wall Street rule" a mutual fund merely sells its shares if that sophisticated investor
dislikes a company's management. Editorial, Advisers Will Have Their Hands Full with the
Reform Law, INV. NEWS, July 26, 2010, at 11.
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On the other hand, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010,157 executed by President Barack H. Obama on July
21, provided of the Securities and Exchange Commission:
The Commission may issue rules permitting the use by a share-
holder of proxy solicitation materials supplied by an issuer of se-
curities for the purpose of nominating individuals to membership
on the board of directors of the issuer, under such terms and condi-
tions as the Commission determines are in the interests of share-
holders and for the protection of investors.'
58
Thus, the Commission became empowered to allow investor nomi-
nation of directors, on corporate proxies mailed to shareholders, solely the
companies' own nominees appearing on such theretofore.
159
2. The Directors Doze
The ordinary reactive incentive of the board of directors is weak if that
board is dominated by heavily-remunerated business executives, including
CEOs. 16° According to Commissioner Troy A. Paredes of the Securities and
Exchange Commission-speaking on his own behalf and not that of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission nor of his fellow Commissioners:
Boards of directors are expected to improve decision making
by spurring deliberation. In acting as a body, the promise is that
boards will draw on the distinct perspectives, experiences, sensi-
bilities, and expertise that different directors offer. The expecta-
tion is that as the group works through a range of ideas and argu-
ments, the ultimate decision will be better as a result of the direc-
tors' collective efforts.
The active engagement of directors is a lynchpin of meaning-
ful deliberation. Decision making should improve when direc-
tors-whether interacting with each other or with management-
engage in open and frank discussions, even if it means being criti-
cal. When assessing some course of action, directors should ask
probing questions and follow-ups of each other and of manage-
157. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. I ll-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
158. Id. at § 971(b).
159. Jesse Westbrook, The SEC's Plan to Pry Open Corporate Boards, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 16-29, 2010, at 29.
160. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 139, at 448.
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ment; should challenge key assumptions; should offer competing
analyses; and should develop competing options to ensure that al-
ternatives are considered and not cast aside too readily. Put
differently, directors should be willing to dissent, and disagree-
ment from others should not be discouraged or suppressed. When
it leads people to engage rigorously, disagreement helps ensure
that the unknown is identified, that information is uncovered, and
that challenges and opportunities are assessed in a more balanced
way. Indeed, a board may want to consider designating one or two
directors whose express charge is to be skeptical and to press when
needed. 161
Paredes' notion of directors being expressly charged to be skeptical was
popularly bandied during the Jones Supreme Court of the United States liti-
gation.1 62 And, for megabanks commanding more than $100 billion in as-
sets, accountable boards of super-directors have been proposed to implement
customized executive compensation systems.1 63 Such a little knot of inde-
161. Paredes, supra note 40.
162. See generally Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
Boards often have need of a devil's advocate. But it shouldn't always be the same per-
son, and particularly not a director who was appointed because his or her views differ from the
group's. Anyone who always looks at issues critically may end up being typecast as an "odd-
ball" or a "cynic" whose comments should not be taken too seriously.
One way around the problem is to choose a different director to play devil's advocate at
each meeting. The choice can depend on the issues to be discussed. Or ask for volunteers.
This is also a way to help reluctant lone dissenters test whether others share their
opinion.
Jean-Francois Manzoni et al., Why Diversity Can Backfire on Company Boards, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 25, 2010, at R3.
[Tihere will be a tendency to overestimate how likely or well supported a hypothesis is,
in the absence of procedures designed specifically to call up and consider countervailing evi-
dence. The evidence upon which we base our beliefs is not (in general) a random sample of
the relevant evidence available to us or of the evidence that we already (in some sense) pos-
sess. A striking and salient presentation of some evidence will produce biases in the recall of
other evidence and hence biases in the resulting beliefs. Hence, it is especially important in as-
sessing a possible belief not merely to consider the evidence for and against that we have
thought of but to make particular and systematic efforts to call up all the relevant evidence, for
and against, that we have.
ROBERT NoziCK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 101 (1993) (footnotes omitted) (Nozick's
emphasis) (citing JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahne-
man et al. eds., 1982)). Indeed, in the best-performing U.S. companies there tend to appear
highly contentious boards. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE
KNOWLEDGE 201 (2006) (stating Nozick's point). "But a formal requirement of devil's advo-
cacy enhances group performance far less than does authentic dissent." Id. at 211 (stating the
point of Manzoni et al.).
163. ROBERT POZEN, Too BIG TO SAVE? How To FIX THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYsTEM 285
(2010).
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pendent directors" would be added according to a model loosely founded
upon the boards of companies under the control of private equity funds.
65
For inherently feeble are broadly-based bars against executive compensa-
tion.' 66 So ingenious are lawyers in circumventing such restrictions that
these seldom prove effective and occasionally prove counterproductive.
67
During 2010, Stanford University's Kenneth J. Arrow-who in 1972
was awarded the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics168-judged that
the most important innovation in economic theory during the two 1960-2010
generations had been its emphasis upon asymmetric information.' 69 Unfor-
tunately, boards of directors are opaque entities, even to many institutional
investors and corporate executives. 70 Individual shareholders holding small
positions know little who board members are.17 ' Too many board members,
beholden to the CEO ship-captain who piped them aboard, fail to represent
shareholder interests for that reason. 72 The United Kingdom imposes nine-
year term limits upon independent directors, to force board turnover. 73 The
value in reducing cronyism can outweigh the price in lost experience.1
74
Moreover, a board employing a second-best CEO candidate-on the
ground she would serve far more cheaply than would the foremost candi-
date-must expose itself to criticism should she come a cropper. 175 Whereas
the board covers its own assets by paying top dollar for the very best.
176
Should that CEO fail, the directors will appear less blameworthy. 177 Even
competition in a corporation's product and capital markets cannot constrain
even managerial misconduct, which increases corporate costs. 178 The prob-
164. Id. at 285.
165. Id. at 284.
166. POZEN, supra note 163, at 276.
167. Id.
168. BANNOCK ET AL., supra note 49, at 9.
169. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Theory and the Financial Crisis, in THE IRRATIONAL
ECONOMIST: MAKING DECISIONS IN A DANGEROUS WORLD 187 (Erwann Michel-Kerjan &
Paul Slovic eds., 2010). "Insurance companies had long understood the consequences of
asymmetry of information under such headings as moral hazard and adverse selection." Id. at
188 (Arrow's emphasis).
170. JOHN GILLESPIE & DAVID ZWEIG, MONEY FOR NOTHING: How THE FAILURE OF
CORPORATE BOARDS IS RUINING AMERICAN BUSINESS AND COSTING Us TRILLIONS 4 (2010).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 5.
173. Id. at 263.
174. Id.
175. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 139, at 448.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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lem of agency costs inheres in the structure of any big enterprise, and is not
eliminable through competition.'79
3. The Ideal of Fiduciary Duty
Nevertheless, Duke University economist Rachel E. Kranton and
George A. Akerlof, who in 2001 was awarded the Alfred Nobel Memorial
Prize in Economics, propound that the foremost consideration in an execu-
tive's incentives could be her role as a fiduciary. 8° Given limited liability,
an incentive to indulge in excess risk arises at once. The heavier a gamble,
the more stockholders look to gain should the roulette wheel rest upon their
color. Should their bet fail, the larger losses accrue to their corporation's
creditors alone once shareholders' equity is exhausted.'' And a pay for per-
formance scheme attracts, ominously, risktakers. 182  Self-sorting alters the
ratios of various personality types found in various activities. Businessper-
179. Id. The work of Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried includes Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Summer 2003, at 71, and Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction
in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002). Bebchuk & Fried
attribute lush executive compensation to rent seeking. See generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK &
JESSE FRIED, supra note 137. Their thesis drew the riposte:
Executive compensation differs substantially among firms and has changed dramatically
over time. Bebchuk and Fried provide no explanation of those differences or changes. They
tell a plausible story that corporate executives have some managerial power, but they make no
case that the differences in executive compensation are explained by the unmeasured differ-
ences in board compliance and the limits on compensation that would not provoke outrage, ei-
ther among firms or over time. In summary, there is no reliable body of evidence that is con-
sistent with substantial managerial power over their own compensation, and the managerial
power perspective provides no explanation of the substantial differences in executive compen-
sation among firms or over time.
WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, REFLECTIONS OF A POLITICAL ECONOMIST: SELECTED ARTICLES ON
GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND POLITICAL PROCESSES 319-20 (2008) (reviewing BEBCHUK &
FRIED, supra).
180. GEORGE A. AKERLOF & RACHEL E. KRANTON, IDENTITY ECONOMICS: How OUR
IDENTITIES SHAPE OUR WORK, WAGES, AND WELL-BEING 59 (2010).
181. Benjamin M. Friedman, Two Roads to Our Financial Catastrophe, N.Y. REV., Apr.
29, 2010, at 27, 27. Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz was asked: "Are the financial reforms now
being debated in Congress strong enough to prevent the next crisis?" His reply, inter alia,
ran:
Another big issue is bonuses and incentives. We've been reluctant to take the kind of
strong measures that the United Kingdom has taken [such as heavy taxation of bonus pay-
ments]. Incentives matter. They affect behavior, and they can encourage excessive risk tak-
ing.
David Futrelle, Why the Bailout Needs a Reboot, MONEY, May 2010, at 113, 114.
182. George Akerlof & Rachel Kranton, It Is Time to Treat Wall Street Like Main Street,
FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 25, 2010, at 9.
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sons are more probably optimists than are librarians. 8 3 Inside an investment
company, traders tend to be the optimists but risk managers the pessimists."
A firm might be bankrupted, and an executive can be-at worst-
dismissed if she has committed no fraud. Extra bonuses rewarding her for
performance during the sunny days go unrepaid during subsequent wintery
times. Therefore, risky investments which are profitless socially-i.e., of a
negative anticipated value, or of a positive anticipated value inadequate to
recompense for a market-determined risk value-can be privately rational for
a decision maker: She need not bear the entirety of those negative conse-
quences she lays upon others.185 Fact-patterns wherein marketplace rational
self-interest elicits socially irrational outcomes are termed cases of "rational
irrationality."' 18
6
Also, during a classic bubble, an asset can command a price steeply
above its fundamentals--e.g., the discounted present value of the imputed
rents of a house-for so long as that price is anticipated to soar the higher.
183. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 151, at 296.
184. Id. Cf NICK TASLER, THE IMPULSE FACTOR: WHY SOME OF US PLAY IT SAFE AND
OTHERS RISK IT ALL (2008). Sure enough, when head of risk at Lehman Brothers Madeline
Antoncic in 2006 suggested that declining housing prices could mean the balance sheet should
come down, President and Chief Operating Officer, Joseph M. "Joe" Gregory, told her she
was not only too fussy but out of line. VICKY WARD, THE DEVIL'S CASINO: FRIENDSHIP,
BETRAYAL, AND THE HIGH STAKES GAMES PLAYED INSIDE LEHMAN BROTHERS 159 (2010).
The general directive from Gregory was "do as much business as you can; take risk." Id.
It is hard to think of business activities with cultures as different as those of retail and in-
vestment banking. The former is intrinsically bureaucratic and hierarchical, relying on the ac-
curate processing of millions of transactions every day with an infinitesimal proportion of er-
rors. It is done best by people who empathise [sic] with their customers. The latter is naturally
buccaneering and entrepreneurial; the people who do it best are aggressive and self-centered.
Successful retail banking is based on relationships; modem investment banking is based on
transactions.
John Kay, We Must Press on with Breaking up Banks, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 15, 2010, at
11.
185. Arrow, supra note 169, at 190. In the view of George Mason University economist
Russell Roberts:
The expectation by creditors that they might be rescued allows financial institutions to
substitute borrowed money for their own capital even as they make riskier and riskier invest-
ments. Because of the large amounts of leverage-the use of debt rather than equity-
executives can more easily generate short-term profits that justify large compensation. While
executives endure some of the pain if short-term gains become losses in the long run, the
downside risk to the decision-makers turns out to be surprisingly small, while the upside gains
can be enormous. Taxpayers ultimately bear much of the downside risk. Until we recognize
the pernicious incentives created by the persistent rescue of creditors, no regulatory reform is
likely to succeed.
RUSSELL ROBERTS, GAMBLING WITH OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: HOW PERVERTED INCENTIVES
CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 6 (2010).
186. JOHN CASSIDY, How MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES 142
(2009).
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But as prices zoom ever higher beyond their asset's fundamentals, inves-
tors-to make sense of increasingly-crazy prices---expect them to inflate at
still speedier rates.187 Competitive pressures in a bubble impel a financier to
bet rationally-particularly while gambling her diversified investors' mon-
ey. 188 Short term business horizons translate into the NIMTOF attitude: Not
In My Term of Office. Before 2008, the temptation of hefty annual bonuses
deterred persons from hedging their bets or weighing the chances of a finan-
cial meltdown, such as that transpiring in October 2008.189
In one reading, pay for performance demonstrates mala fides. It in-
forms the employee that she is not trusted to choose the right thing. Any-
way, undiscovered remains the equation for quantifying bonuses and stock
options to correspond with the correct incentive. There is no crystal ball.' 90
Do not CEOs manipulate matters like inventories, collections, or payments,
to monkey with quarterly earnings, and so manipulate their stocks' price,
whereby to see options issued at bargain-basement prices?19' The proper
incentive, conclude Kranton and Akerlof, should be to live up to her respon-
187. Kenneth Rogoff, Spotting the Tell-Tale Signs of Bubbles Approaching, FIN. TIMES
(London), Apr. 8, 2010, at 22. Some hold that a bubble is detectable prior to its burst. Ed-
ward Chancellor, Bubbles: A Victorian Lesson in Mania, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 12, 2010,
at 24. On the other hand, scholars debate whether bubbles are easy to identify. Andrew Od-
lyzko, This Time Is Different: An Example of a Giant, Wildly Speculative, and Successful
Investment Mania (June 21, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/-odlyzko/doc/mania01 .pdf.
188. See POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY, supra note 151, at 32.
189. Howard Kunreuther, Reflections and Guiding Principles of Dealing with Societal
Risks, in THE IRRATIONAL ECONOMIST: MAKING DECISIONS IN A DANGEROUS WORLD 263, 270
(Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Paul Slovic eds., 2010).
190. AKERLOF& KRANTON, supra note 182.
191. Cf Ivo Ph. Jansen & Lee W. Sanning, Cashing in on Managerial Malfeasance: A
Trading Strategy Around Forecasted Executive Stock Option Grants, 66 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 85,
85 (2010). Discerns U. of Toronto Rotman School of Management Dean Roger Martin:
More than anything else, stock-based incentive compensation is responsible for short-termism
in the modern corporation and the shrinking average tenure of today's chief executives. It is
an incentive for manipulating expectations rather [than] improving real performance.
The solution is to replace stock-based compensation with incentives that affect underly-
ing value-whether that is increasing revenues, profitability, market share, customer service
or, optimally, a combination of all of these. And for longer-term incentives based on the actual
market not the expectations market, use royalties on real results, as are given to designers, in-
ventors and musicians. The bottom line is that if you want to skew reality, use stock-based
compensation. But if you want to build the real company, use incentive compensation anc-
hored in reality-based measures.
Roger Martin, Reward Real Growth, Not Expectations, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 3, 2010, at
10. Comparably, Graef Crystal, the compensation consulting pioneer, "recommends awarding
stock options with a strike price that's the average of the last 90 days and can't be exercised
for five years to avoid 'opportunistic' pricing." Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Alexis Leondis,
How Much Is a CEO Worth?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, May 10-16, 2010, at 70.
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sibilities.' 9' To be sure, entirely self-interested behavior can be abjured in
lieu of a sense of fiduciary responsibility, even independently of a sense of
identification with others.'93 Opines Amartya Sen:
It must, of course, be recognized that the rejection of purely self-
interested behavior does not indicate that one's actions are neces-
sarily influenced by a sense of identity with others. It is quite
possible that a person's behavior may be swayed by other types of
considerations, such as her adherence to some norms of acceptable
conduct (such as financial honesty or a sense of fairness), or by her
sense of duty-or fiduciary responsibility-toward others with
whom one does not identify in any obvious sense. Nevertheless, a
sense of identity with others can be a very important-and rather
complex-influence on one's behavior which can easily go against
narrowly self-interested conduct.
194
Affirmatively, as framed by Kranton and Akerlof: "In the financial
world, it is called fiduciary duty. It is an obligation to serve the client and
the larger good of an organization."' 95 Negatively: "Acting in your own
interest and not in the interest of clients is a failure to carry out the duties of
office, to fulfill one's fiduciary duty.' 96
And the language of fiduciary duty is the language of the Harris Asso-
ciates fees.
B. The Law and Economics of the Harris Associates Fees
In 2009, the distinguished economist Thomas Sowell fumed that many
intellectuals:
find it a weighty consideration that they do not understand how
corporate executives can be worth such high salaries as they re-
ceive-as if there is any inherent reason why third parties should
192. Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 182. Whatever the incentive, some people are self-
motivated. Or, as articulated in a didactic novel by Ralph Nader, the famed consumer protec-
tion lawyer: "That's what successful, self-made people of wealth are like .... They are
chronically averse to procrastination-one definition of an entrepreneur is someone who never
does anything today that could have been done yesterday-and that trait alone gives them a
major advantage over their competent but slower-paced peers." RALPH NADER, ONLY THE
SUPER-RICH CAN SAVE Us! 79 (2009).
193. AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE: THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY 22-23 (2006).
194. Id. Amartya Sen was awarded the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in
1998.
195. Akerlof & Kranton, supra note 182.
196. Id.
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be expected to understand, or why their understanding or acquies-
cence should be necessary, in order for those who are directly in-
volved in hiring and paying corporate executives to proceed on the
basis of their own knowledge and experience, in a matter in which
they have a stake and intellectuals do not.
197
Supposing that Sowell's belittling of intellectuals' digs against corpo-
rate executives' salaries is meritorious, this line of thought cannot be disposi-
tive of the legal profession's scrutinizing of the compensation collected by
the advisers of registered investment companies. For Section 36(b) lays a
special fiduciary duty upon such advisers. And Section 36(b) further depu-
tizes the security holders of such registered investment companies ("third
parties") to litigate against said investment advisers. Section 36(b) endures
in a financial-regulatory world rocked by the first great recession of the
twentieth century. 198 Therein do fiduciary finance institutions of 2011 like
collective investment vehicles emerge beside insurers and banks as a pillar of
the world's financial system.199
1. The Competition Conundrum
Truly, the functioning of investment firms entailing information asym-
metries might evoke regulation insulating investors from incompetence and
fraud.2° In such respect the regulation of portfolio management displays
affinity with regulation of the free professions. °1 Specifically, opportunistic
behavior often being facilitated through asymmetric information, regulators
avowedly defend consumers from excessive prices extracted by financial
197. THOMAS SOWELL, INTELLECTUALS AND SOCIETY 26-27 (2009).
198. See, e.g., THE FIRST GREAT RECESSION OF THE 2 1sT CENTURY (Oscar Dejudn, Eladio
Febrero, & Maria Christina Marcuzzo eds., 2011); THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE
REGULATION OF FINANCE (Christopher J. Green, Eric J. Pentecost & Tom Weyman-Jones eds.,
2011); FINANCIAL STABILITY (Charles A.E. Goodhart & Dimitrios P. Tsomocos eds., 2011);
THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (Benton E. Gup ed.,
2010). The 2007-09 Great Recession exposed more than the fragility in the financial markets.
See, e.g., FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL FRAGILITY (Jan Toporowski ed., 2010). For, as
scholars hearkened, it likewise evoked questions about the adequacy of modem macroeco-
nomic theory and about a seeming parallel incapacity to establish the requisite theoretical
basis underlying financial regulation. See, e.g., MACROECONOMIC THEORY AND ITS FAILINGS:
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (Steven Kates ed., 2010).
199. See, e.g., MARTIN GOLD, FIDUCIARY FINANCE: INVESTMENT FUNDS AND THE CRISIS IN
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011).
200. Dirk Heremans, Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 950, 967 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000).
201. Id.
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service producers and other financial market participants.2 °2 And in this re-
gard regulation addresses not systemic stability, but the efficiency and
integrity of the financial markets.0 3 In sum, the central notions are oppor-
tunism, asymmetric information problems, agency problems, and fiduciary
duty.
Anyway, "[c]ompetition in product and capital markets can't be counted
on to solve" compensation challenges. 204 Both legal scholars and economists
feel aversion to monopoly and so favor competition, generally. 20 5 However,
exactly why is competition welcomed and monopoly scorned? 206 Because
competition guarantees alternatives, whereas monopoly precludes alterna-
tives.20 7 Presence of alternatives checks competitive market firms from gross
misallocation of resources, while monopolistic exploitation of resources
waxes inefficient.20 8 Remember that regulators address the efficiency of fi-
nancial markets.
Still, competition in product and capital markets falters since an identic-
al structure of incentives emerges in all big corporations and similar entities,
e.g., mutual funds.209 Long preceding the February 27, 2007, District Court
opinion in Jones210 had the mutual fund industry been dominated by a hand-
ful of corporations. 21I And does the bracing discipline of additional competi-
tors trigger more intensive competitor-effort and improved service? 212 Sur-
prisingly, in at least some contexts the reply is not congruent with the profes-
sional intuition.2 13 The impact of competition proves an unsettled topic even
regarding pricing.21 4
202. Id. at 965.
203. Id.
204. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) (per curiam).
205. Bingyuan Hsiung, Economic Analysis of Law: An Inquiry of Its Underlying Logic, 2
ERASMUS L. & ECON. REV. 1, 15 (2006).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Jones, 537 F.3d at 730.
210. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04-C-8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *9 (N.D. II1. Feb.
27, 2007), vacated by 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
211. David Hoffman, A Changing Landscape, INV. NEWS, Mar. 29, 2010, at 12. "[B]ut
continuing fallout from the recent [October 2007-March 2009] market downturn and other
structural factors have created opportunities for nimbler, smaller companies to gain more
business." Id.
212. JULIAN L. SIMON, EFFORT, OPPORTUNITY, AND WEALTH 85 (1987).
213. Id.
214. Id. It was the University of Hamburg's Institute of Law and Economics' Ingo C.
Fiedler whose scholarship most recently probed the merits of two-sided competition. See Ingo
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Notably, Posner's special concern in Jones lies in Harris' charging cap-
tive funds over double its charges to independent funds:2 15 "The panel opi-
nion throws out some suggestions on why this difference may be justified,
but the suggestions are offered purely as speculation, rather than anything
having an evidentiary or empirical basis. 2 16  Judge Posner sarcastically
could have quoted to Easterbrook from the Epistles of Saint Paul: "Now
faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.
For eye-popping was a 2009 study by the New York University Stern School
of Business' Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef of the University of Vir-
ginia's Department of Economics.1 8 They utilized detailed data about wag-
es, education and occupations toward explaining the U.S. financial sector."9
Wages in finance were excessive from the mid-1990s until 2006.220 For that
interval, rents accounted for an estimated thirty to fifty percent of the wage
differential between the financial sector and the balance of the private sec-
tor.22 ' Rentseeking is inter alia, a socially costly wealth transfer.222 Posner's
dissent cites Professor Camelia M. Kuhnen's observation that "'[w]hen di-
rectors and the management are more connected, advisers capture more rents
and are monitored by the board less intensely.' 223 Kuhnen might bitingly
have quoted from the Gospel of Saint Matthew: "Consider the lilies of the
field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin: And yet I say unto
you, That even Sol'o-mon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of
these., 224 To the extent they reap rents, nattily clad advisers toil not.
C. Fielder, Antitrust in Two-Sided Markets: Is Competition Always Desirable? (Oct. 25,
2010) (unpublished working paper) (on file with Nova Law Review).
215. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) (per curiam).
216. Id.
217. Hebrews 11:1 (King James).
218. See generally Thomas Phillipon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the
U.S. Financial Industry: 1909-2006 (Jan. 2009) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 14644), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w]4644.
219. Id. at6.
220. Id. at 5.
221. Id. at 30.
222. See George Steven Swan, The Low and Economics of Interprofessional Frontier
Skirmishing: Financial Planning Association v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 16 U.
MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 75, 127 (2007).
223. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Camelia M. Kuhnen, Social Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting
in the Mutual Fund Industry (Mar. 1, 2007) (unpublished abstract).
224. Matthew 6:28-29 (King James).
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2. Price Discrimination
Too, Posner elsewhere had addressed the seriousness of information de-
ficiencies in ordinary markets. 5  Most consumers prove to be uncareful
shoppers. Some even suppose price a sign of quality. 26 If half of consumers
are well-informed but half not, then the latter will make numerous errors and
suffer loss of utility.227 Yet these errors are minimized because the unin-
formed are somewhat protected by the informed. This latter phenomenon
emerges because a seller usually cannot easily discriminate between these
two blocs.228 Recall how Chief Judge Easterbrook reassured one that sophis-
ticated investors shopping among alternative investment vehicles generate
229competitive pressure protective of the less sophisticated investors.
Several conditions must obtain for price discrimination to prove profit-
able. Initially, there must be such market segregation as to preclude arbi-
225. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 97, at 192.
226. Id. at 219. Scholars of everyday applied-economics, see, e.g., TIM HARFORD, THE
UNDERCOVER ECONOMIST: EXPOSING WHY THE RICH ARE RICH, THE POOR ARE POOR-AND
WHY YOU CAN NEVER BUY A DECENT USED CAR! (2006), descry a method in such consumer
madness: Price changes the very experience of quality. "Neuro-economists have found, for
instance, that while placebo painkillers work, they work best if the subject thinks they are
expensive. Energy drinks give you less energy if you buy them at a discount. And wine tastes
better if you believe that it is expensive." Tim Harford, Dear Economist: Resolving Readers'
Dilemmas With the Tools of Adam Smith, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 30, 2010, at 2. How
might these neuro-economic findings be explicable? Yale psychologist Professor Paul Bloom
propounds essentialism as the notion that what truly counts is the underlying (not superficial)
reality of a thing. PAUL BLOOM, How PLEASURE WORKS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF WHY WE LIKE
WHAT WE LIKE 9 (2010). It consequently matters whether artwork is an original Picasso. Id.
at 119-20. Human beings are born-essentialists. Id. at xii. For typically do art, sports, games,
music, etc., display such reproductively-relevant capacities as intelligence. People's essential-
ism could emerge as their attraction to a performance's underlying history, due to their plea-
sure derivative from its display of natural gifts. Id. at 154.
227. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 97, at 192. In the appraisal
of S.C. Johnson Distinguished Professor of International Marketing Philip Kotler at Northwes-
tern University's Kellogg School of Management:
Most economists emphasise the role of price in determining choice, to the neglect of oth-
er major forces such as advertising, sales promotion and sales personnel that shape and moti-
vate consumer and business behaviour. My argument has been that besides macro and micro
economics, economists must add "market economics" (ie, marketing) to the study of how the
market place actually works. This advance is already being reflected in the rise of "behaviour-
al economics."
Philip Kotler, Letter to the Editor, Don't Forget the Effect of Marketing, FIN. TIMES (London),
Apr. 20, 2010, at 8.
228. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 97, at 192 n.86, 219.
229. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 634 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated by 130 S. Ct.
1418 (2010).
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trage-i.e., buyers in one market cannot resell into another.23° Second, a
seller must command some monopolistic power in a minimum of one market
because, given competition, prices will be pressed to the cost-level. 231 Third,
buyers in different markets must evince different elasticities of demand.
Sales rise to the higher prices in markets wherein elasticity is low. 232 The
latter explains the willingness of consumers in a first market to pay more
than the consumers in a second market without the seller losing sales in that
second market. Under perfect price discrimination, a different price is char-
geable to each customer.
2 33
More specifically, under what is denominated third degree price dis-
crimination, sellers allot buyers into classes in accordance with those buyers'
demand for elasticity,234 a different price being extracted from each group.2
35
Implausible though it might sound, the real world is abrim with discounted-
price products which actually were more expensive to manufacture than their
full-price counterparts. 236  This dual-marketing nevertheless makes sense
insofar as it smoothes a producer's targeting of its price-increases at a block
of consumers most willing to pay, i.e., for those full-price counterparts. 237
230. BANNOCK ET AL., supra note 49, at 326.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See, e.g., George Steven Swan, The Law and Economics of ERISA and Fiduciary
Duty: LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 403, 444 (2010).
"Elasticity signifies sensitivity to price changes." George Steven Swan, The Political Econo-
my of State Democracy: Romer v. Evans, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1, 47 (1996) (citing
ERWIN ESSER NEMMERS, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS 140 (1970)).
235. NEMMERS, supra note 234, at 324. According to one law and economics expert,
Emory University economist Paul H. Rubins: "The welfare implications of discriminatory
pricing in general are ambiguous. But if price discrimination makes it possible for firms to
provide goods and services that would otherwise not be available (which is common for vir-
tual goods and services such as software, including cell phone apps) then consumers unambi-
guously benefit." Paul H. Rubin, Op-Ed., Ten Fallacies About Web Privacy, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 30, 2010, at A13.
236. Tim Harford, Dear Economist: Resolving Readers' Dilemmas with the Tools of
Adam Smith, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 27-28, 2010, at 2.
237. Id. Yet, starting with the publication, Fisher Black and Myron S. Scholes, The Pric-
ing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973), finance turned from
common sense to abstraction and self-referentiality. JOHN LANCHESTER, 1. 0. U.: WHY
EVERYONE OWES EVERYONE AND No ONE CAN PAY 45 (2010). Understandably did economist
Lawrence H. Summers acidly distinguish general economists in the Department of Economics
from the ketchup economists (finance economists) in the Department of Ketchup (Department
of Finance). The former ask the right questions: "General economists are concerned with the
fundamental determinants of prices and quantities in the [Kietchup market." Lawrence H.
Summers, On Economics and Finance, 40 J. FIN. 633, 633 (1985). But those sorry ketchup
economists? 'They have shown that two quart bottles of ketchup invariably sell for twice as
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Most enterprises set prices to attract customers and goose the bottomline; it
is traditional to gouge the loyal customers. The solitary recognized justifica-
tion for rewarding fealty is to create it where previously it was nonexistent.238
Such is the lesson of elasticity.
Apply to Jones the three conditions for profitable price discrimination.
Are the effective buyers of Jones independent funds unable to arbitrage-
viz., to resell to the captive funds' effective buyers? Yes. Second, does Har-
ris Associates command some monopolistic power in one market? Yes, evi-
dence suggests. The Seventh Circuit panel merely speculated over why Har-
ris charges captive funds over twice its charges to independent funds. Third,
do different Harris customers evince different elasticities of demand? Yes,
evidence might suggest. Posner muses over the Jones panel assurance that
advisers cannot harvest money from captive funds if Himalayan fees drive
off investors: "That's true; but will high fees drive investors away?, 239
More specifically, respecting this third condition for price discrimina-
tion, customers cannot for fear of the higher price be expected to volunteer
their low elasticity. Consequently, sellers seek something observable and
correlated with this hidden demand characteristic, low elasticity 24°  Sure
enough, experimentation has tested why individuals invest in high-fee index
funds-there being a broad variation of fees in the universe of S&P 500 in-
dex funds. It reveals that even if such funds are reduced to commodities-
i.e., stripped of non-portfolio services-subjects overwhelmingly fail to mi-
nimize fees, due to their own financial illiteracy.24' It proves this "individu-
al," by contrast with "institutional" feature of investors in a captive mutual
fund, demarcates in itself a financially illiterate and thus easily-fleeced flock
with low elasticity of demand. So how protected are the less-informed con-
sumers of investment products by the better-informed investors' competitive
pressure? Imaginably, less-informed consumers are so ill-protected by com-
much as one quart bottles of ketchup except for deviations traceable to transactions costs, and
that one cannot get a bargain on ketchup by buying and combining ingredients once one takes
account of transactions costs." Id. at 634. Ought Summers' ketchup economists go to school
under Harford? For bargains are to be had in the real-world retail ketchup market. MARK DI
VINCENZO, BUY KETCHUP IN MAY AND FLY AT NOON: A GUIDE TO THE BEST TIME TO BUY
THIS, Do THAT AND Go THERE 23 (2009).
238. Tim Harford, Dear Economist: Resolving Readers' Dilemmas with the Tools of
Adam Smith, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 13-14,2010, at 2.
239. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissent-
ing) (per curiam).
240. DONALD E. CAMPBELL, INCENTIVES: MOTIVATION AND THE ECONOMICS OF
INFORMATION 257 (2d ed. 2006).
241. James J. Choi et al., Why Does the Law of One Price Fail? An Experiment on Index
Mutual Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1405, 1408 (2010).
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petitive pressure that the majority of voters summoned the section 36(b) pro-
tection of the ill-informed (as suggested in Sec. IV, supra), such are the va-
garies of contract law and economics.242
3. Informational Disclosure
Nor are the perplexities of befuddled mutual fund investors necessarily
to be resolved by informational disclosure. In the assessment of Loyola Law
School of Los Angeles Professor Lauren E. Willis:
In addition to arithmetic manipulation of data, determining the
expected value of many financial choices requires assessing in-
formation reliability and interpreting results. The skills needed to
take data about the past and information about the future and pre-
dict the probabilities of future events and confidence intervals for
those probabilities are elusive for even sophisticated consumers.
Becoming a Certified Financial Planner therefore requires a pro-
gram of study that includes financial planning, risk management
and insurance, estate planning, retirement planning, employee
benefits, investments and individual income tax, three years of re-
levant experience, a ten-hour exam that requires an integrated ap-
plication of skills and knowledge to particular client situations, and
thirty hours of continuing education every two years to maintain
the credential. Consumers must acquire not only the particular
knowledge and skills described above, but also the ability to em-
ploy all of them at once.
24 3
Human capital resources most efficiently are exploited when persons
perform tasks for which they are best-fitted by predilection or training.
People generally decline to serve as their own attorneys or physicians and for
division of labor efficiency alone should decline, generally, from serving as
242. See, e.g., CONTRACT LAW & ECONOMICS (Gerrit de Geest ed., 2d ed. 2011).
243. Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 224
(2008) (footnotes omitted). Willis' proves a "powerful" article. See Michael Skapinker,
Finance Could Benefit from People's Trust, FIN. TIMES (London), May 25, 2010, at 11. Sure
enough, a mid-2010 review of Australia's 17 year-old mandatory defined contribution pension
system declared that "'member-driven competition through choice of fund has struggled to
deliver a competitive market that reduces costs for members."' Pauline Skypala, How to Put
Scheme Members First, FIN. TIMES (London), July 12, 2010, at 6 (quoting a recent review of
the Australian system). The report discovered participants to be less rational or informed than
had been assumed. Id. Hence, regulators cannot depend on disclosure and market pressures
to control that costly, inefficient system. Id.
20111
37
Swan: The Law and aEconomics of Mutual Fund Investment-Adviser Fiduciar
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
their own financial planner. 244 The staggering expenditure of energy and
time required for someone of average literacy to strive seriously to become
her own financial planner could easily yield a grander welfare return when
invested elsewhere.245
Or, in the words of Commissioner Paredes:
It also is possible for there simply to be too much information for
investors and others to work through constructively. The risk of
"information overload," in other words, is a cost of mandatory dis-
closure. Investors today are inundated with volumes of informa-
tion, so much so they sometimes are unable to distinguish what is
important to their decision making from what is not. As a result,
investors too frequently do not bother carefully studying the in-
formation that is available and get overwhelmed or distracted,
misplacing their focus on less important matters. In short, the
sheer amount of information can frustrate its effective use. The
trouble is that when information is not processed and interpreted
effectively, disclosure does not translate into better decision mak-
ing. Ironically, if investors are overloaded, more disclosure actual-
ly can result in less transparency and worse decisions.
24 6
244. Willis, supra note 243, at 263-64. David Hume wrote maladroitly: "By the partition
of employments, our ability encreases: .... DAVID HUME, TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 485
(1992). Hume consequently lost paternity for the modem division of labor phraseology to
Adam Smith. HARDIN, supra note 97, at 10 n.5. The division of labor prevails because it
uncages the economy of scale. HARFORD, supra note 154, at 81. "It is a harsh truth about the
world of work that for many professionals, the more work you have done in the past, the more
productive each additional working hour becomes: a perfect example of economies of scale."
Id. The division of labor mandates professional financial planners, not self-helpers. See id.
But consumers don't even know what a financial planner does. See Sheila McClune,
Consumers Still Unsure About What Financial Planners Do, RESEARCH SPOTLIGHT, Second
Quarter 2010, at 4. And if professional planners are too pricey for the masses, can the gap be
filled by web-based money management? George Mannes, The Future of Investing Advice,
MONEY, June 2010, at 104. "MyMoney.gov is the U.S. government's website dedicated to
teaching all Americans the basics about financial education." MYMONEY,
http://www.mymoney.gov (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). "The site organizes financial educa-
tion help from over 20 different Federal web sites in one place." Id. In 2009, this site only
garnered approximately 85,000 hits monthly. Karen Blumenthal, Is There a Cure for Finan-
cial Illiteracy?, WALL. ST. J., June 19-20, 2010, at B8. But more hopeful is the recent startup,
Veritat Advisers, an online financial planning service. Jason Zweig, Screen Savers: Will
Online Financial Planning Catch on?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7-8, 2010, at B7. Thanks to auto-
mation, Certified Financial PlannerM Tom Mooney at Veritat thinks he can serve 1,000
clients per annum. Id.
245. Willis, supra note 243, at 264.
246. Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the Sympo-
sium on "The Past, Present, and Future of the SEC" (Oct. 16, 2009), (transcript available at
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As more theoretically clarified by Herbert A. Simon-who in 1978 was
awarded the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics:
247
[Given] an information-rich world, the wealth of information
means a dearth of something else: a scarcity of whatever it is that
information consumes. What information consumes is rather ob-
vious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth
of information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate
that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information
sources .... 248
The genuine bottleneck is the attention-time of human decision makers
using incoming data.2 49  The authentic design difficulty is not providing
people with more information. It is allotting the time people have available
for digesting data so decision makers will consume only such data as is most
relevant and important to their decisions.2 50  For attention, being scarce, is
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ll01609tap.htm). Spectacular has proved the failure of
mandated disclosure, modern society's most common technique for protecting personal au-
tonomy. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 3
(Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Empirical Legal Studies Ctr., Working Paper No. 9, 2010), availa-
ble at http:/law.bepress.com/umichlwps/empirical/art9. "In sum, although better disclosure
and financial education may be helpful, the evidence in this article and Beshears et al. (2008)
indicates that their effect on portfolios is likely to be modest." Choi et al., supra note 241, at
1430 (citing J. Beshears et al., How Does Simplified Disclosure Affect Individuals' Mutual
Fund Choices? I (Nat'l. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14859, 2009).
247. BANNOCK ET AL., supra note 49, at 381. The most recent book-length, scholarly
application of Simon's theories is JONATHAN BENDOR, BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND POLITICS
(2010).
248. Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World, in
COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 40-41 (Martin Greenberger ed.,
1971).
Plato has Socrates tell the story of Egyptian god Theuth inventing letters and display-
ing his feat to Theban King Thamus. Thamus remonstrates:
To your students you give an appearance of wisdom, not the reality of it; thanks to you,
they will hear many things without being taught them, and will appear to know much when for
the most part they know nothing, and they will be difficult to get along with because they have
acquired the appearance of wisdom instead of wisdom itself.
PLATO, PHAEDRUS 62 (Christopher Rowe trans., 2005). Or: "Where is the wisdom we have
lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?" VERNA ALLEE, THE
KNOWLEDGE EVOLUTION: EXPANDING ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 16 (1997) (quoting
T.S. ELIOT, THE ROCK (1934)).
249. HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 143 (3d ed. 1996).
250. Id. at 144. "Time is our most valuable nonrenewable resource, and if we want to treat
it with respect, we need to set priorities." ALBERT-LAszLO BARABA91, BURSTS: THE HIDDEN
PATTERN BEHIND EVERYTHING WE Do 125 (2010).
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precious: "' "Scarcity of attention in an information-rich world can be
measured in terms of a human executive's time.' '212 Hence, the well-known
disutility of data dumps.
Posner did recognize the Easterbrook "so unusual" compensation level
triggering a judicial inference of deceit, or of abdication2 3 Unfortunately,
"The panel's 'so unusual' standard is to be applied solely by comparing the
adviser's fee with the fees charged by other mutual fund advisers. '5 4 Under-
stand: '"The governance structure that enables mutual fund advisers to
charge exorbitant fees is industry-wide, so the panel's comparability ap-
proach would if widely followed allow those fees to become the industry's
floor.
255
C. The Citizenry Seethed While the Judiciary Pondered
Especially because of Judge Posner's connection of mutual fund adviser
fees to executive compensation, his dissent was attended-to in corporate
251. SIMON, supra note 248, at 48. Is there any escape from informational pitfalls menac-
ing even the most sophisticated investors riding the most elaborate computational machinery?
A study by Snajeev Arora and Boaz Barak both of the Princeton U. Computer Science De-
partment and Center for Computational Intractability, Markus Brunnermeier of Princeton's
Department of Economics and Bendheim Center for Finance, and Rong Ge of the Department
of Computer Science and Center for Computer Intractability realized that most analyses of the
2007-2009 financial crises blamed faulty models in pricing derivatives. Yet that evokes the
question of whether a more precise model would prove prophylactic against future problems.
Seemingly, will such pricing problems endure even given superior models? The pricing prob-
lem should grow more difficult for more complicated models.
Traditional economics argues that financial derivatives ameliorate the costs inflicted
by asymmetric information: Alas, using theoretical computer science modes, these authors
argue that derivatives actually can amplify asymmetric information costs. Sanjeev Arora et
al., Computational Complexity and Information Asymmetry in Financial Products 12 (Oct. 19,
2009) (unpublished working paper), available at www.cs.princeton.edu/-rongge/derivative.
pdf. "Note that computational complexity is only a small departure from full rationality since
even highly sophisticated investors are boundedly rational due to a lack of requisite computa-
tional resources." Id. at 1.
252. SIMON, supra note 248, at 41. "[W]e crave speed everywhere because it saves time,
the scarcest resource of all." PETER W. HUBER & MARK P. MILLS, THE BOTTOMLESS WELL:
THE TWILIGHT OF FUEL, THE VIRTUE OF WASTE, AND WHY WE WILL NEVER RUN OUT OF
ENERGY 138-39 (2005).
253. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (per curiam).
254. Id.
255. Id. "And in this case there was an alternative comparison, rejected by the panel on
the basis of airy speculation--comparison of the fees that Harris charges independent funds
with the much higher fees that it charges the funds [that] it controls." Id.
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America.2 6 The Jones controversy came to a boil amidst national debate257
over whether the market can be entrusted with naming the pay rates of corpo-
rate executives. 58 And excesses in compensation of the financial executives
crucially inflamed the populace after the stock market meltdown climaxing
in March, 2009.259 A political tempest concerning Goldman Sachs' 2009
compensation 26 preceded a still-roiling public ire over executive compensa-
tion in 2010.261 Between the Supreme Court oral argument in Jones and the
issuance of the Supreme Court's opinion in Jones, President Obama re-
marked in an interview on February 9, 2010, concerning Goldman Sachs
CEO Lloyd Blankfein and J.P. Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon:
Let's talk bonuses for a minute. Lloyd Blankfein: $9 million.
Jamie Dimon: $17 million. Now, those were in stock and less
than what some had expected. But are those numbers O.K.? First
of all, I know both those guys. They are very savvy businessmen.
And I, like most of the American people, don't begrudge
people['s] success or wealth. That is part of the free-market sys-
tem.
I do think that the compensation packages that we have seen over
the last decade, at least, have not matched up always to perfor-
mance. I think that shareholders oftentimes have not had any sig-
nificant say in the pay structures for CEOs.
Seventeen million is a lot for Main Street to stomach.
Listen. $17 million is an extraordinary amount of money. Of
course, there are some baseball players who are making more than
that and don't get to the World Series either, so I am shocked by
that as well.
I guess the main principle we want to promote is safe say on
pay, that shareholders have a chance to actually scrutinize what
CEOs are getting paid, and I think that serves as a restraint and
helps align performance with pay. The other thing we do think is
the more that pay comes in the form of stock that requires proven
256. Ameet Sachdev, Mutual Fund Fee Case Tests What Is a Reasonable Charge, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 3, 2009, at 19.
257. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon & Serena Ng, Fresh Pay Skirmish Erupts at AIG, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 7, 2009, at Al.
258. Adam Liptak, Justices Scrutinize Adviser Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009, at B 1.
259. POZEN, supra note 163, at 291.
260. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY, supra note 151, at 148-49.
261. d.at Ill.
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performance over a certain period of time, as opposed to quarterly
earnings, is a fairer way of measuring CEO success and, ultimate-
ly, will make the performance of American businesses better.
26 2
Conspicuously does President Obama not signal-as might Chief Judge
Easterbrook-that no corporate executive compensation issue arises if share-
holders can always sell their stock, and thus invest elsewhere? Are corporate
executive tip-top earners truly worth their keep. 63
And Jones caught the eye of the Supreme Court partly because Jones
entailed an unusual clash between Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posn-
er.264 Those jurists number among the American judiciary's foremost law
and economics thinkers.2 65 Each man generally sympathizes with letting
legal questions be settled through marketplace values. 66 Certainly one learns
that legal issues are analyzable from varied angles, many such angles enabl-
ing the harvesting of bountiful yields. 267 That the subdiscipline of law and
economics-roughly a subdiscipline of microeconomics' marketplace val-
ues-thrives is demonstrable because, inter alia, scholars of that area not
merely publish academically, but as United States federal judges can influ-
ence the legal system firsthand.268 When Professor Bingyuan Hsiung of the
National Taiwan University Department of Economics made this latter point,
Hsiung cited as exemplars both and only Easterbrook and Posner.269 The
Supreme Court granted a petition for issuance of a writ of certiorari in Jones
262. Obama's Corporate Messaging, BLOOMBERG Bus. WEEK, Feb. 22, 2010, at 33, 35
(emphasis added).
263. See DAVID BOLCHOVER, PAY CHECK: ARE ToP EARNERS REALLY WORTH IT? (2010);
see, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear
Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (2010).
264. Sachdev, supra note 256.
When the full court split on whether to rehear the case, Posner penned a dis-
sent that read like an invitation to the Supreme Court, writing that the notion that
the market can police excessive compensation is "ripe for reexamination."
Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Resists Touching Rule on Mutual Fund Fees, WASH.
POST, Mar. 31, 2010, at A3 [hereinafter Barnes, Mutual Fund Fees] (quoting Jones v.
Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F. 3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting)).
265. Robert Barnes, Justices Tackle Case on Investment Fees, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2009,
at Al I [hereinafter Barnes, Investment Fees]. "The case was set up for the high court by
competing opinions of two of the appeals courts' leading thinkers on economics and the law."
Barnes, Mutual Fund Fees, supra note 264.
266. Sachdev, supra note 256.
267. Hsiung, supra note 205, at 10.
268. Id. at 2.
269. Id. at 2 n.3.
[Vol. 35
42
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss2/5
JONES V. HARRIS ASSOCIATES LP.
on March 9, 2009,270 to resolve a split over the proper section 36(b) standard
among the Courts of Appeals.27'
VI. THE ORAL ARGUMENT OF NOVEMBER 2,2009
During the November 2, 2009, oral argument over Jones in the Supreme
Court, Chief Judge Easterbrook's new understanding of the limits upon those
fees that investment advisers can charge mutual funds272 went undefended by
anyone concerned.273 Some among the Justices suggested that a regulatory
body might be better-positioned than is the judiciary to ascertain whether
fees are not appropriate.274 Conservative Justices, shying from the Easter-
brook logic, appeared skeptical of arguments that investors are in need of
court intervention to defend them from the gravid fees that a fund manager
might cut with a board, with which he or she enjoys a chummy relation-
ship.275 Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. and Justice Antonin Scalia were
the most outspoken in positing that government regulators, or consumers,
were the preferable monitors of these fees.276
In an exchange of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg with Assistant to the Solicitor General Curtis E. Gannon-
arguing on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the
Jones petitioners-Roberts and Scalia referred to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission as if to imply Congress ought never have attached the
Investment Company Act section 36(b) fiduciary duty at all:
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, if we are going to have
regulation of what fees can be charged, you cite in your brief the
various regulations the SEC has issued. It makes a lot more sense
to have the SEC regulate rates than to have courts do it, doesn't it?
270. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 129 S. Ct. 1579, 1580 (2009).
271. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1422 (2010). "The [Seventh Circuit
panel] opinion [in Jones] is recognized to have created a circuit split, although the panel did
not acknowledge this or circulate its opinion to the full court in advance of publication, as is
required when a panel creates a circuit split." Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 732
(7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
272. Jess Bravin, Justices Weigh Fees Investment Advisers Charge Mutual Funds, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 3, 2009, at A6.
273. Liptak, supra note 258.
274. See id.
275. Bravin, supra note 272.
276. Barnes, Investment Fees, supra note 265.
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MR. GANNON: Well, in the abstract, it might make more sense,
Mr. Chief Justice. I think the choice that Congress made here was
to counterbalance the-
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You are not suggesting the SEC
wouldn't have authority to do that, are you?
MR. GANNON: Well, even under this statute, the SEC has the
authority to file suits under section 36(b).
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Has it filed any?
MR. GANNON: It hasn't filed any since-since 1980, Justice
Ginsburg. I think that the SEC in this context-it has-it has pri-
marily directed its resources and energies into encouraging there to
be better disclosure of fees, both the disclosure of information to
the board, disclosure to investors, better education to shareholders
so that they would be able to go-
JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, it must be aware of the-of the diver-
gence between the fees that investment advisers charge to these
companies and what they charge to other clients. Isn't the SEC
aware of that?
MR. GANNON: It is aware of that.
JUSTICE SCALIA: And yet has brought no suits against this in-
dustry?
MR. GANNON: Since 1980 it hasn't used section 36(b). It has
used less formal mechanisms in the context of examinations and
investigators-
JUSTICE SCALIA: For disclosure, just for disclosure. But that
suggests to me that the SEC may think that this is indeed a self-
contained industry and that the comparison with investment advice
given to other entities is-is not a fair one.
277
Yet Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor questioned
278
whether a free market could be relied upon to police fees. Justice Breyer
277. Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-21, Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418
(2010) (No. 08-586).
278. Sachdev, supra note 256; David G. Savage & Walter Hamilton, High Court Debates
Whether Mutual Fund Fees Are Too High, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009, at B2.
[Vol. 35
44
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss2/5
JONES V. HARRIS ASSOCIATES L P.
evinced concern over the cozy relationship with the fee-setting board of di-
rectors.279 Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg appeared
to support the notion that mutual fund boards ought to utilize as their bench-
marks those fees that asset managers levy upon institutional investors, ac-
cording to Chicago-Kent College of Law Assistant Professor William A.
Birdthistle, who attended the hearing.280 Birdthistle had filed a brief in sup-
port of investors on behalf of over twenty law professors.28 1.
Commentators presciently supposed that the Easterbrook opinion was
unlikely to survive the forthcoming Supreme Court opinion in Jones.282
Questioning seemed to signal that the bench was inclined to decide Jones
narrowly.283 It was unclear whether the Justices would return Jones to the
lower courts to forge a new standard, or would tackle that job themselves. 28
Liberal Justices, including Breyer and Ginsburg, appeared disposed toward
the remand of Jones for further proceedings to flesh out disputed fee ar-
rangement facts.285 It remained unclear how substantial a role the Supreme
Court might assign to the comparison with fees charged institutional inves-
tors .2 8 6
VII. INTERLUDE: COMMISSIONER PAREDES ON JONES
A. The Securities and Exchange Commission Guards America
On May 4, 2009, Commissioner Paredes addressed Jones' issues on his
own behalf, and not that of the Securities and Exchange Commission or of
his fellow Commissioners: 287
279. Barnes, Investment Fees, supra note 265.
280. Savage & Hamilton, supra note 278. Professor Birdthistle is an expert in such mat-
ters. See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Re-
wards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. R. 1401 (2006).
281. See Brief for Jerry N. Jones et al. as Amici Curiae Law Professors Supporting Peti-
tioners, Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010) (No. 08-586).
282. Liptak, supra note 258.
283. Barnes, Investment Fees, supra note 265.
284. Liptak, supra note 258. "Despite a line of questioning that seemed to suggest that the
Supreme Court justices are leery of getting into the business of setting standards, however, it
is hard to tell what the court will ultimately determine." David Hoffman, Advisers: SEC, Not
Courts, Should Set Standards for Mutual Fund Fees, INV. NEWS, Nov. 9, 2009, at 20.
285. Bravin, supra note 272.
286. See Liptak, supra note 258.
287. Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Speech by SEC Commis-
sioner: Remarks Before the Mutual Fund Directors Forum Ninth Annual Policy Conference
(May 4, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/ spch05O4O9
tap.htm).
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Section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act, adopted in 1970,
provides that the "investment adviser of a [mutual fund] shall be
deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of
compensation .... " Section 36(b)'s adoption was driven by the
view that the investment adviser's fee negotiation with the fund is
not at arm's length, but tilts in the adviser's favor, because the
fund, in practice, is captured by the adviser.
288
Yes, the captive mutual fund. At this juncture, Paredes added that the
relevant legislative history sustained his view, quoting a Senate Report:
Since a typical fund is organized by its investment adviser which
provides it with almost all management services and because its
shares are bought by investors who rely on that service, a mutual
fund cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the
adviser. Therefore, the forces of arm's-length bargaining do not
work in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as they do in
other sectors of the American economy.289
This Maytime Paredes here sounded receptive to protection of consum-
ers by the Supreme Court in Jones. Nevertheless, as oral argument in Jones
loomed, the Commissioner on September 24, 2009, seemed to have changed
his tune. Paredes then related-on his own behalf-of Jones:
Much could be said about the case. Indeed, the briefs are exten-
sive. I will limit myself to highlighting two core points, leaving
the details to others.
First, adequate market discipline can obviate the need for more ex-
acting and burdensome regulation, including demanding judicial
scrutiny of advisory fees. One can conceive of the section 36(b)
fiduciary duty as compensating for a lack of competition in the
mutual fund industry. Put differently, the legal accountability of
section 36(b) can be thought of as substituting for a lack of mar-
ket-based accountability. The industry, however, has changed
since section 36(b) was adopted in 1970 and Gartenberg was de-
cided in 1982. To the extent the industry has become more com-
petitive, it may argue for greater judicial deference to the bargain
the adviser and the fund strike. In the face of sufficient market
288. Id. (discussing and citing Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-547, § 36(b), 84 Stat. 1413, 1429 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35b
(2006))).
289. Id. at n.10 (quoting S. REP. No. 91-184 (1969), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897,
4901).
[Vol. 35
46
Nova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 5
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol35/iss2/5
JONES V. HARRIS ASSOCIATES L.P.
forces that constrain advisory fees, the need for courts to monitor
as strictly the adviser/board fee negotiations is mitigated.
Second, courts are not well-positioned to second-guess the busi-
ness decisions that boards and others in business make in good
faith. Judges may exercise expert legal judgment, but not expert
business judgment. A judge may be equipped to monitor a board's
decision-making process, but should steer clear of the temptation
to override substantive outcomes. These sensibilities cut against
reading section 36(b) as implementing a sort of substantive limit
on fees and instead recommend that courts focus on the process by
which the fees were determined.
An especially large advisory fee that appears to be "disproportio-
nate" would seem to evidence that the decision-making process
that produced the fee was inexcusably tainted, giving rise to a sec-
tion 36(b) fiduciary duty breach. However, if on further scrutiny a
court determines that careful, conscientious, and disinterested mu-
tual fund directors agreed to the fee, little, if any, room is left for
the court to declare that the fee is nonetheless so large that it could
not be the result of an arm's-length bargain. To the contrary, if a
faithful, diligent board decided that the fee was appropriate, it
would seem to rebut any preliminary determination that the fee ran
afoul of section 36(b). The prospect that perhaps a better bargain
could have been driven is a slim justification for allowing
judges-who have no comparative expertise negotiating or setting
advisory fees-to substitute their judgment for the collective
judgment of independent directors acting in good faith.29 °
Paredes' language signaling that market discipline obviates the need for
demanding judicial scrutiny, that courts are ill-positioned to second-guess
boards, and board diligence would rebut pro-consumer determinations,
seemed language pro-boards in Jones.
For years observers moaned, even during the Jones Supreme Court liti-
gation,29' that the Securities and Exchange Commission had more and more
290. Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the Invest-
ment Company Institute's Annual Capital Markets Conference (Sept. 24, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spchO92409tap-ici.htm).
291. See, e.g., Jim McTague, The GOP Gets Wired, BARRON'S, Jan. 25, 2010, at 48,49 ("I
don't share his faith in the SEC. It became a captive of the industry under previous adminis-
trations. As for Chairman [Mary] Schapiro, she headed the self-regulatory arm of the Nasdaq
exchange during the time that Nasdaq member Bernie Madoff pulled of the biggest Ponzi
scheme since the launch of Social Security."). On the other hand, additional voices hurrahed a
supposed Securities and Exchange Commission revitalization through, for example, its reor-
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waxed sympathetic to the pleading of potent corporations at cost to its pro-
tection of the public.292 By 2009, when Mary Shapiro assumed the captaincy
of the SEC, it was a laughingstock. 293  By 2010, something of a litany of
Commission limitations, and Commission regulatory failings could be re-
cited. A substantial cause of the mid-September 2008 financial collapse
294
ganization of its enforcement unit. Jack Willoughby, SEC Sharpens Its Teeth, BARRON'S, Jan.
25, 2010, at 45, 45. "The enforcement division is undergoing a transformation intended to
make it quicker in detecting and combating fraud." Kara Scannell, SEC Taking Another Look
at Penalty Policy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6-7, 2010, at B3. Hailed also was the SEC hiring of
Henry T.C. Hu to quarterback the Commission's Division of Risk, Strategy and Financial
Innovation (RiskFin), the Commission's "first new division in 37 years." Kara Scannell, At
SEC, Scholar Who Saw It Coming, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2010, at Cl. For Hu authored Henry
T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise
of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457 (1993). "SEC leaders accept that the real
test of this internal revolution will come in the courts." Jean Eaglesham & Brooke Masters,
No Longer a Doormat, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 27, 2010, at 5.
292. See, e.g., Swan, supra note 222, at 123. Who ultimately is responsible for SEC
lapses? The Supreme Court's June 28, 2010, opinion in Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Ac-
counting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010) explained that the parties therein had agreed
that the SEC Commissioners cannot be removed Presidentially, but for cause. Id. at 3148.
Yet Justice Breyer's dissent, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Sotomayor, highlights
"[t]he fact that Congress did not make the SEC Commissioners removable 'for cause."' Id. at
3183 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
293. "A year ago, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission was the target of jeers
such as its lawyers 'couldn't find ice cream at a Dairy Queen."' Jenna Greene, After Drought,
SEC Floods Zone, NAT'L L.J., May 17, 2010, at 1; Donna Rosato, How Well Is the SEC Pro-
tecting You?, CNNMONEY.COM, (Feb. 24, 2010, 8:35AM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/
02/24/news/economy/SECSchapiro.moneymag/index.htm. Shapiro shared this exchange
with interviewer Donna Rosato:
Do you have the staff and budget to protect investors?
We clearly don't in order to do the job I want to be done. We are 3,800 people total, and
we regulate 35,000 public entities: 12,000 public companies for their disclosure, 11,300 in-
vestment advisers, 8,000 mutual funds, 5,000 broker-dealers, 600 transfer agents, exchanges,
clearinghouses.
And we are smaller than we were in 2005. We got our budget increased [23%, to $1.1
billion] for fiscal 2010, and we're working hard with Congress and the administration to in-
crease it much more substantially in upcoming years.
Id.
294. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY, supra note 151, at 41. A Commis-
sion sin of omission was its failure to break the longrunning, high-profile Bernard Madoff
Ponzi scheme: "In fact, after Madoff was arrested, his secretary revealed that the few times
SEC investigators had come to the firm most of them had asked for employment applications.
That was typical." HARRY MARKOPOLOS, No ONE WOULD LISTEN: A TRUE FINANCIAL
THRILLER 63 (2010). "My error was in believing the SEC actually was capable of protecting
investors." Id. Madoff case- whistleblower Markopolos even shares his 2005 submission,
concerning that Ponzi scheme, to the SEC. See generally id. at 297-338 (App. B).
Credible is the secretary's report. For: "The revolving door can turn swiftly at the
Securities and Exchange Commission." Tom McGinty, Staffer One Day, Opponent the Next,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2010, at Cl. Sixty-six of its former employees filed 168 letters with the
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was that regulators slept at the switch.295 The Securities and Exchange
Commission brandished all of the statutory authority required to forestall
broker-dealers from shouldering more risk than was prudent for the econo-
my. 296 But according to Judge Posner, the agency completely dropped the
ball.2 97 After all, the Commission is the shop with the attorneys who do their
own photoduplicating, filing, and mail-sorting.298 Such budgetary strategiz-
ing begets thriftily-hired lawyers but gives birth to dearly-hired clerical staff.
The sole practical means of averting an overly large housing bubble-aside
from hiking interest rates-would have been rigorous enforcement by, inter
alia, the Commission of its authority over shadow banks.29 Most of these
Commission's secretary in 2008 and during the initial nine months of 2009 "disclosing clients
or new employers [whom] they planned to represent before the agency." Id. "A Senate panel
asked the Securities and Exchange Commission's inspector general to review the agency's
'revolving door,' which shuttles many SEC staffers into jobs with the companies they once
regulated." Tom McGinty, SEC 'Revolving Door' Under Review, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2010,
at Cl. Fittingly does section 968 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 968, 124 Stat. 1914 (2010), require the U.S. Comptroller
General to conduct a study of the SEC. revolving door. The Comptroller is to submit the
report to Congress in 2011. Id.
295. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY, supra note 151, at 336.
296. Id. (citing Michael J. Halloran, Systemic Risks and the Bear Stearns Crisis, in THE
ROAD AHEAD FOR THE FED 151 (John D. Ciorciari & John B. Taylor eds., 2009)).
297. Id. at 173. "In the immediate wake of the financial crisis, a view held by some was
that the SEC would not survive the then-nascent effort to launch financial regulatory reform."
Erich T. Schwartz, Investor Protection and SEC Enforcement New Authority and Directed
Studies Increase Risks and Costs for Finns, in THE DODD-FRANK ACT: COMMENTARY AND
INSIGHTS 143, 147 (2010).
298. Thomas Frank, Porn Didn't Give Bernie Madoff His Start, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28,
2010, at A15.
299. Editorial, Let's Not Kill the Shadow Banking System, INV. NEWS, Apr. 19, 2010, at
10. The shadow banks sector was so christened by Paul McCulley at Jackson Hole, Wyom-
ing, in an August 2007 speech to economists. Gillian Tett, How the Sector Got Its Name-and
Why It Would Prefer a Different One, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 3, 2011, at 9. The shadow
banking sector is also known, more formally, as the securitization markets. "Indeed, by some
measures, the securitisation 'engine' was providing more than half of credit creation in the US
economy in the first few years of the 21 st century." Gillian Tett, Securitisation Engine Grinds
Down, FIN. TIMES (London) May 10, 2010, at 5. In Britain, a massive shadow banking system
created by a proliferation of structured investment vehicles centered in London swelled invisi-
bly to nearly everyone beyond the specialist credit market. GILLIAN TETr, FOOL'S GOLD:
HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET
GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 97-99, 183, 189-91, 195-96 (2009).
In the United States, between 1980 and approximately 2006 had arisen an "essentially
unregulated shadow banking sub-industry of financial institutions that provided a variety of
banklike services," virtually to a parity with commercial banking. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF
CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY, supra note 151, at 42. The biggest objection to separating commer-
cial banking from shadow banking derives from delineating what is or is not commercial
banking. Id. at 360. Finance Prof. Gary B. Gorton of Yale contends:
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are SEC regulated.300 Yet, according to Judge Posner, the Commission lacks
expertise in systemic risk matters.3 '
In all events, such has proceeded the rise of mutual funds 302 that Com-
missioner Paredes wondered whether industry evolution since the 1970
enactment of the Investment Company Act justifies an expanded judicial
deference to the adviser-fund bargain.0 3 Moreover, after the November
second oral argument in Jones, the Commissioner-on his own behalf-
cautioned concerning comparing retail fund advisory fees against fees levied
against institutional funds:
I would add that if the Court were to require a comparison of fees,
judges still should not second-guess the substance of the indepen-
dent directors' good faith evaluation of the fees charged different
funds and the reasons justifying any fee differences. To say that
the board is to consider a particular factor should not dictate how
that factor is considered and how it impacts a final fee determina-
tion. Simply put, fee comparisons should not morph into fee
caps.
304
Is a watchdog against fee caps the more defending the fund-i.e., inves-
tors-from the adviser, or the more protecting the monied adviser from its
fund? Fittingly was the concept of the Securities and Exchange Commission
as chief defender of mutual fund shareholders fully developed for the Su-
preme Court in Jones in an amicus curiae brief filed by the Mutual Fund
The events of 2007 are essentially a repeat of the 19th century bank runs, only in 2007
some firms ran on other firms. What has become known as the "shadow banking system" is,
in fact, genuine banking and, it turns out, was vulnerable to the same kind of bank runs as in
previous U.S. history.
GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 6 (2010). One major
shadow bank was Bear Stearns and another was Lehman Brothers. John Cassidy, Lessons
From the Collapse of Bear Stearns, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 15, 2010, at 9.
If it quacks, it is a duck. If it borrows short and lends (or invests) long, it is a bank. Offi-
cially, Bear Steams and Lehman Brothers were investment companies; Washington Mutual
was a savings & loan; AIG was an insurance company, GMAC and GE Capital were subsidiar-
ies of industrial corporations; the Reserve Fund was a money market mutual fund. In reality,
all of them were handing out money, or near money, and accumulating illiquid assets. Any
such institution is vulnerable to a run by creditors and regulators should treat them alike-as
banks. Failure to adhere to this principle will result in regulatory arbitrage and more blow-ups.
Id.
300. See POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY, supra note 15 1, at 38, 56.
301. Id. at 352.
302. See, e.g., FINK, supra note 37.
303. Paredes, supra note 40.
304. Id.
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Directors Forum on behalf of Harris Associates. °5 One recollects Assistant
to the Solicitor General Gannon's report to Justice Ginsburg that the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission had filed no suits under section 36(b) since
1980.' 06
B. Washington Guards America
To be sure, Washington might showcase over a half-dozen avowedly-
consumer financial protection bureaus. Who else other than the Securities
and Exchange Commission champions the mass of investors confronting
monied opportunists? The Congressional Oversight Panel was created in
2008 to monitor the Department of the Treasury's bank-bailout, and to re-
view financial market regulation. 07 Harvard Law School Professor Eliza-
beth Warren chairs that Panel.3 °8 In a March 3, 2010 interview, Chair War-
ren held:
Someone said monetary policy was in the penthouse and consumer
protection was in the basement.
It's the stepchild nobody wants. There's nobody in Washington
focused on the economics of the family, focused on the consumer
products-credit cards, mortgages, car loans, overdraft fees. All
the stuff you have to do in your daily life to survive economical-
ly. 
30 9
Chair Warren could expatiate:
305. Jones v. Harris Associates, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/
cases/jones-v-harris-associates/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). Such was highlighted by Stanford
Law School's Connor Williams. Could the Court Look to the SEC to Regulate Advisory
Fees?, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/2009/11/could-the-court-look-to-the-sec-to
regulate-advisory-fees/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
306. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 277, at 20-21 and accompanying text.
307. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL: ABOUT Us, http://cop.senate.gov/aboutl (last
visited Apr. 20, 2011).
308. Charlie Rose, Elizabeth Warren: Outrage and Financial Reform, BLOOMBERG Bus.
WK., Mar. 15, 2010, at 17.
309. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added). An essay by Professor Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at
Any Rate, is credited widely with planting the seed for the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection. See Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL OF IDEAS
Summer 2007, at 8; Damian Paletta, Hurdles for Warren in Agency Launch, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 18, 2010, at A2, created in Title X of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1964 (2010).
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A whole new bureaucracy even though the Fed has the tools to
start doing it tomorrow?
There are seven bureaucracies in Washington right now that each
own a piece of consumer financial protection. Bloated, inefficient,
and either ignored and ineffective or captured by the large finan-
cial institutions. [This is] the regulatory system we've got now. It
works very well for the large financial institutions because it
means no effective regulation.310
Familiar to students of law and economics is the capture theory of the
regulatory agency.31I Regulated firms capture their own regulators via lob-
bying to promote parochial, not economy-wide, business interests.312 The
capture theory of the regulatory agency proves applicable particularly in the
financial sector.313 Was it not relevant in Jones?
310. Rose, supra note 308, at 18 (bracketed material in original) (emphasis added). There
exist "roughly 115 federal and state financial regulatory bodies." LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF,
JIMMY STEWART IS DEAD: ENDING THE WORLD'S ONGOING FINANCIAL PLAGUE WITH LIMITED
PURPOSE BANKING 126 (2010). Did Warren hope to captain number 116? Warren was on the
short list to be President Obama's appointee as America's first consumer finance-regulator,
directing the newborn Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. Damian Paletta, Consumer
Post Prospect Has Democrats in Knots, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2010, at A5.
311. See Swan, supra note 222, at 120-22. "In the regulatory minuet, the consumer inter-
est and the producer interest are opposed." Id. at 129. The relationship between the Interior
Department's Minerals Management Service and BP proved "a striking example of regulatory
capture." Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., The Gulf Spill, the Financial Crisis and Government
Failure, WALL ST. J., June 14, 2010, at A] 7.
One place we've already begun to take action is at the agency in charge of regulating
drilling and issuing permits, known as the Minerals Management Service. Over the last dec-
ade, this agency has become emblematic of a failed philosophy that views all regulation with
hostility-a philosophy that says corporations should be allowed to play by their own rules and
police themselves. At this agency, industry insiders were put in charge of industry oversight.
Oil companies showered regulators with gifts and favors, and were essentially allowed to con-
duct their own safety inspections and write their own regulations.
Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill
(June 15, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-officelremarks-
president-nation-bp-oil-spill).
312. Heremans, supra note 220, at 951.
313. Id. at 952.
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VIII. JUSTICE ALITO'S GARTENBERG-PLUS OPINION
A. Jones Ratifies Gartenberg
Justice Samuel Alito's opinion in Jones314 for the Supreme Court at-
tracted a concurrence from Justice Clarence Thomas.315 Jones met with no
dissents. Justice Alito explained that the Court therein measured what mu-
tual fund shareholders must prove to show that their mutual fund adviser has
breached its fiduciary duty under section 36(b).316 The Court, as mentioned
in Section V C, supra, had granted certiorari317 to resolve a division among
the Courts of Appeals over that appropriate section 36(b) standard. 318
In Section I of Jones, Justice Alito acknowledged that a typical ar-
rangement is that a mutual fund, which might have no employees of its own,
is created by a separate entity denominated as an investment adviser.319 This
adviser not only manages the fund investments and delivers other services,
but also selects the fund's directors. 320 Due to this intimate investment ad-
viser-mutual fund symbiosis, a fund oftentimes practically cannot sever the
relationship. 32' This walls-off the normal forces of arm's-length bargain-
in322 Here, Alito echoes the Commissioner Parades of May 24, 2009. Be-
cause of Congressional concern over the potential for abuse consequently
inhering in the investment companies' structure, the Investment Company
Act of 1940323 was adopted.324 In a further response to difficulties relative to
investment company board independence, and to investment adviser com-
pensation, Congress amended that Act in 1970.325 Thereby was reinforced
the independence of the mutual fund board of directors, which scrutinizes
and negotiates the adviser's compensation.326 Also, section 36(b) then im-
posed both the fiduciary duty upon the investment adviser respecting its in-
come from the "mutual fund, and granted [the] individual investor[] [the]
314. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
315. Id. at 1431 (Thomas, J., concurring).
316. Id. at 1422.
317. Id. at 1425.
318. Id.
319. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1422 (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480-81 (1979)).
320. Id. at 1422 (citing Burks, 441 U.S. at 481).
321. Id.
322. Id. (citing, inter alia, Burks, 441 U.S. at 481).
323. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I (2006 & Supp. It 2010).
324. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1422 (citing Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 536
(1984)).
325. Id. at 1422-23.
326. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19), 80a-10(a), 80a-15(c).
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private right of action for breach of [such] duty. 327 Once more, Alito chan-
nels the May 24 Parades. The fiduciary duty did not, however, permit a
court review for the reasonableness of the compensation agreement.
328
Justice Alito related that the Jones petitioners were "shareholders in
three different mutual funds managed by respondent Harris Associates L.P.,
the investment adviser., 329 Petitioners had sought damages, an injunction,
and the rescission of advisory agreements between their funds and Harris
Associates.330 Their complaint had alleged the violation of section 36(b) in
Harris Associates' charging of fees "'disproportionate to the services ren-
dered"' and beyond the ambit of what would have been reached via arm's-
length negotiations "'in light of all of the surrounding circumstances.'
' 331
The District Court had granted summary judgment for Harris Associates by
applying the Gartenberg standard 332 "The District Court assumed that it was
relevant to compare the challenged fees with those that Harris Associates
charged its other clients. 333 Justice Alito recalled that the Seventh Circuit
panel in Jones had affirmed, but had based its affirmance upon its own Eas-
terbrook reasoning, disavowing Gartenberg.334 That panel's reasoning, as
indicated in Section IV, supra, focused nearly wholly upon the disclosure
element.335 Yet Alito's opinion likewise recalled that upon that Circuit's
denial of rehearing en banc, Judge Posner dissented that this rejection of
Gartenberg was premised on "economic analysis ...ripe for reexamina-
tion. 336
In Section II of Jones, Justice Alito's Jones discussion of Gartenberg
was somewhat detailed: 337
[Wie conclude that Gartenberg was correct in its basic formulation
of what § 36(b) requires: to face liability under § 36(b), an in-
vestment adviser must charge a fee that is so disproportionately
large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services ren-
327. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1423; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b).
328. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1423.
329. Id. at 1424.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1424.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. (quoting Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner,
J., dissenting) (per curiam)).
337. Id. at 1425-28.
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dered and could not have been the product of arm's length bargain-
ing.
338
Correct in its basic formulation. The Gartenberg approach adheres to
the correct comprehension of fiduciary duty and the section 36(b)(1) imposi-
tion of the burden on the plaintiff:339 Approval of the adviser's fee by the
board of directors is to be awarded as much consideration by the judiciary as
appropriate given all of the circumstances; and the benchmark for reviewing
challenged fees is the range possibly emergent from an arm's-length bar-
gain. 340 The Gartenberg approach also adheres to the requisite role of the
fully-informed mutual fund board encompassing its statutorily-prescribed
disinterested directors: 341 "First, a measure of deference to a board's judg-
ment may be appropriate in some instances. Second, the appropriate meas-
ure of deference varies depending on the circumstances.
' 342
Gartenberg, being thus established as correct in its basic formulation,
what adds Jones to this Gartenberg foundation, sculpting Jones into a Gar-
tenberg-plus?
B. The Jones Additions to Equal a Gartenberg-Plus
In Section Ir-the main event of Jones-Justice Alito, without dissent,
adds these Supreme Court teachings: "The first concerns comparisons be-
tween the fees that an adviser charges a captive mutual fund and the fees that
it charges its independent clients. 343 Gartenberg, as related in Section JV,
supra, rejected the comparison of fees the adviser in Gartenberg had charged
a money market fund (captive mutual fund) and those it had charged a
pension fund (independent client)." Alito contrariwise determined that,
inasmuch as the statute mandates considering every relevant factor:345 "lWe
do not think there can be any categorical rule regarding the comparisons of
338. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1426.
339. Id. at 1427. It is axiomatic in economics that choice proves beneficial (although the
empirical accuracy of the axiom is debatable). BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE:
WIHY MORE IS LEss 19 (2004). Supposedly choice bears little relevance to someone's rational-
ity. RENATA SALECL, CHOICE 143 (2010).
340. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1429-30.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 1428.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1429-30.
345. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1428.
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the fees charged different types of clients.' '3 6 His explicit preclusion of any
categorical rule marks an Alito addition to Gartenberg:
Instead, courts may give such comparisons the weight that they
merit in light of the similarities and differences between the ser-
vices that the clients in question require, but courts must be wary
of inapt comparisons. As the panel below noted, there may be sig-
nificant differences between the services provided by an invest-
ment adviser to a mutual fund and those it provides to a pension
fund which are attributable to the greater frequency of shareholder
redemptions in a mutual fund, the higher turnover of mutual fund
assets, the more burdensome regulatory and legal obligations, and
higher marketing costs .... If the services rendered are sufficiently
different that a comparison is not probative, then courts must reject
such a comparison. Even if the services provided and fees charged
to an independent fund are relevant, courts should be mindful that
the Act does not necessarily ensure fee parity between mutual
funds and institutional clients contrary to petitioners' conten-
tions.
347
This explicit preclusion of any categorical rule respecting comparing
fees charged to different types of clients developed the law in a pro-plaintiff
direction-fee parity between mutual funds and institutional clients being not
necessarily guaranteed by the Act.
The Alito opinion continues: "By the same token, courts should not re-
ly too heavily on comparisons with fees charged to mutual funds by other
advisers. These comparisons are problematic because these fees, like those
challenged, may not be the product of negotiations conducted at arm's
length."4 8
346. Id. According to one emphatic report: "Next, however, unlike the 2nd Circuit in
Gartenberg, the Supreme Court asserted that 'comparisons between the fees that an adviser
charges a captive mutual fund and the fees that it charges its independent clients' are rele-
vant." Jennifer S. Taub, Jones v. Harris Associates: Let the First Lawsuit Bloom, RACE TO
THE BoTroM (Mar. 30, 2010, 10:36 AM), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/miscellaneous/
jones-v-harris-associates-let-the-first-lawsuit-bloom.html (emphasis in original).
347. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1428-29 (citation omitted).
348. Id. at 1429. Likewise had reasoned Circuit Judge Mansfield for the Second Circuit
panel. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1982).
Appallingly, comparison of an investment adviser's fee against fees charged to mutual funds
by other advisers are problematic on additional grounds:
Remarkably, most boards allow the fund company to define the peer group. In the Oak-
mark case, for example, Oakmark Fund's fees were compared with those of just nine other
funds. By my count, there are [fifty-one] no-load, actively managed, large-blend funds with
more than $1 billion in assets. So what happened to the other [forty-one] funds that didn't
make the peer analysis?
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Carefully apprehend precisely why courts should not rely too heavily
upon comparisons against fees charged mutual funds by other advisers. The
problem is that those fees, themselves, might not be the outcome of arm's-
length negotiation. Expressly, the Supreme Court grasps that the feared
problem is that such comparison-fees are therefore excessive, and so would
be comparative evidence too pro-defendant-adviser.
Justice Alito instructs: "Finally, a court's evaluation of an investment
adviser's fiduciary duty must take into account both procedure and sub-
stance." 349 Understand:
Thus, if the disinterested directors considered the relevant factors,
their decision to approve a particular fee agreement is entitled to
considerable weight, even if a court might weigh the factors
differently .... This is not to deny that a fee may be excessive
even if it was negotiated by a board in possession of all relevant
information, but such a determination must be based on evidence
that the fee "is so disproportionately large that it bears no reasona-
ble relationship to the services rendered and could not have been
the product of arm's-length bargaining."
In contrast, where the board's process was deficient or the ad-
viser withheld important information, the court must take a more
rigorous look at the outcome.
350
The board of directors' procedures, which Alito here exacts, demand
that the board endorsing a particular fee arrangement not merely have pos-
sessed "all relevant information," but actually have "considered the relevant
factors" behind a fee approval for said approval to merit a "considerable
weight."35' As for substance, explicitly, "a fee may be excessive even if it
was negotiated by a board in possession of all relevant information. 352 And
remember that Jones already declares that since the statute requires board
consideration of all relevant factors even the courts applying the statute, to
say nothing of boards, can balance an adviser's captive fund fees against its
Kinnel, supra note 129, at 49. In its evaluation of charges, a board of directors starts with the
15(c) report, measuring its own fund's fees against those charged to competitors. Id. Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (mandating such reports) is further discussed
in the text in Section XA, infra. Whom do captive mutual fund boards of directors really
serve? "No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or
else he will hold to the one, and despise the other." Matthew 6:24; Luke 16:13 (King James).
349. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1429.
350. Id. at 1429-30 (quoting Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928).
351. Id. at 1429.
352. Id.
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independent client fees. Hence, should the board's process-assessing the
relevant factors-prove deficient, the judge can move the more rigorously in
testing the challenged fee.
It is at this juncture that Justice Alito reminds: "It is also important to
note that the standard for fiduciary breach under [section] 36(b) does not call
for judicial second-guessing of informed board decisions. 353  A trifling
shortcoming of this Jones opinion emergent from Justice Alito's pen, or at
least from his chambers, lies in its treatment here, of its Daily Income Fund,
Inc. v. Fox354 precedent. Prior to the 1970 statutory amendments, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission proposed that Congress empower the agency
to launch actions challenging an unreasonable fee, and to intervene in similar
actions brought by, or on the behalf of, an investment company.355 Justice
Alito accurately recounts how industry representatives successfully resisted
such proposal, for fear it "'might in essence provide the Commission with
ratemaking authority.' ' 356 The Commission. Yet the Alito opinion later er-
roneously cites Daily Income Fund for the proposition that Congress repu-
diated a reasonableness requirement under fire for "charging the courts with
rate-setting responsibilities, 357 as distinguished from thus charging the
Commission.
Such a slip might be anyone's in more than a single sense. In the twen-
ty-first century, a Supreme Court Justice who chooses competent clerks, or
merely chooses for herself a capable selector of her judicial clerks, can chum
out impressive opinions absent her personal efforts.358 Today, the service of
353. Id. at 1430. In a sermon unearthed a few months back, Saint Augustine confessed:
'"We who preach and write books... write while we make progress. We learn something
new every day. We dictate at the same time as we explore. We speak as we are still knocking
for understanding."' Lucy Beckett, The Question of What You Love, TIMES LITERARY
SUPPLEMENT (London), Apr. 2, 2010, at 7 (quoting HENRY CHADWICK, AUGUSTINE OF Hippo:
A LIFE xv (2009). Do jurists write opinions to second-guess others, while those daily-learning
jurists themselves still explore for their own understanding?
354. 464 U.S. 523 (1984).
355. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1423.
356. Id. (quoting Daily Income Fund, Inc., 464 U.S. at 538).
357. Id. at 1430. Innocently does Alito alchemize "Commission" into "courts." Noto-
riously did Justice Harlan Stone demote rights "delegated" to rights "surrendered: "'The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.' The amendment states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered." United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 123-24 (1941) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X).
358. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 157 (1996)
[hereinafter POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM; see, e.g., BEHIND THE
BENCH: PORTRAITS OF UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS & THEIR JUSTICES (Todd
C. Peppers & Artemis Ward eds., forthcoming 2011); TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE
MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006).
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law clerks in opinion drafting is openly discussed. 59 The tendency has been
increasingly to delegate opinion-drafting responsibilities to the clerks.36 The
jurist herself transmutes from the drafter into an editor.361 In the Supreme
Court, this evolution is all but completed-at least as is determinable from
the length and from the scholarly apparatus of its Justices' opinions. 362 Of
course, to the extent that Alito's slip evidences a misdirected judicial modes-
ty in erroneously supposing that the 1970 Congress chose then to constrict
the leeway-"second guessing" of "the courts"-consequent interpretive
counterbalancing of that misguided judicial modesty facilitates readings of
Jones the yet more expansively pro-judicial authority under the 1970 enact-
ment.
In all events, not to be second-guessed board decisions look to be those
"informed" by not merely a knowledge of, but by the assessment of-"[if]
disinterested directors consider all of the relevant factors" 363-the captive
fund fee/independent client fee comparison. A "court must take a more ri-
gorous look at the outcome '364 should a board-blessed fee appear born of a
board not "informed," or even just behaving as if uninformed "'bears no rea-
sonable relationship to the services rendered' '.365 The judgment of the Court
of Appeals was vacated.366 Jones was remanded.367
C. The Law and Economics of the Thomas Concurrence
According to Vanderbilt political scientist Pamela C. Corley, the expert
on concurrences in the Supreme Court, only some concurrences in the Su-
preme Court support the majority's opinion.368 A concurrence can detract
from the majority opinion's impact by disagreeing with its reasoning. Yet it
359. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM, supra note 358, at 143.
360. Id.
361. Seeid.atl4l.
362. Id. In 2010, former-Justice John Paul Stevens repeatedly was lauded as the solitary
Justice still preparing the initial drafts of his opinions himself. Todd C. Peppers, Junior Jus-
tices?, NAT'L L.J., June 21, 2010, at 30.
363. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1421 (2010).
364. Id. at 1430.
365. Id. at 1429 (quoting Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923,
928 (2d Cir. 1982)).
366. Id.
367. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1431. "The case itself, Jones v. Harris Associates, No. 08-586,
was returned to the lower courts for application of the new standard." Adam Liptak, Courts
Can Oversee Pay at Funds, Justices Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2010, at B3.
368. PAMALA C. CORLEY, CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 97
(2010).
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also can clarify the outcome of a case and strengthen it.369 The latter it is
with Justice Clarence Thomas' concurrence in Jones. For Justice Thomas
briefly concurred to explain that he understood that the Alito opinion does
not countenance the free-floating judicial fairness review of fees which
Thomas feared Gartenberg could be read to authorize. 370 Thus is the judi-
ciary instructed by Thomas-in so many words-that the Jones enrichment
of Gartenberg is not to be confused with the banned free-ranging judicial
review of the fairness of fees. 37' The stance against expanding the fiduciary
jurisdiction, into deciding what is fair, is apparent. Flannigan stated, "At-
tempting to determine whether decisions are fair or reasonable is very differ-
ent from attempting to ensure that they are made in good faith without the
distortion of self-regard. 372
Sure enough, Flannigan, the law and economics expert, like Justice
Thomas cautions against a judicial prescriptive construction of fiduciary ob-
ligations373 (positive performance) instead of a proscriptive construction (of
personal abnegation): "Loyalty in the conventional fiduciary sense is the
specific obligation to eschew unauthorized conflicts or benefits. '374 The
former (conflicts) are permitted and, in the captive mutual fund circums-
tances, virtually prescribed under section 36(b). But, the latter (unauthorized
benefits) are proscribed. Hence, the Jones controversy: In such a case is an
investment adviser's conflict of interest perhaps inevitable, but an adviser-
abnegation is statutorily incumbent. Flannigan, like Justice Thomas, dis-
claims a judicial free-ranging fairness review in favor of judges, instead,
ensuring that a fiduciary's actions are taken sans any distorting self-regard.375
Jones, of course, actually exemplified the charge of a fiduciary investment
adviser's fee-taking having been distorted by its self-interest. Flannigan arti-
culates the implicit premises impelling Thomas' seal of approval on Alito's
Gartenberg-plus opinion.
IX. THE FINANCIAL PRESS GREETS GARTENBERG-PLUS
The Jones ruling was hailed alike by fund industry representatives and
by investors' advocates. Sure enough, one report on the morning of Jones
369. Id. at 14. What Corley calls an emphatic concurrence emphasizes an aspect of the
Court's holding, and largely functions as a clarification. Id. at 18.
370. Jones, 130 S. Ct. at 1431 (Thomas, J., concurring).
371. Id.
372. Flannigan, Fact-Based Fiduciary Accountability in Canada, supra note 57, at 45 1.
373. Id. at 444-45.
374. Id. at 444.
375. Id. at 451.
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was headed: Jones v. Harris Associates: Let the First Lawsuit Bloom.376
The Wall Street Journal at once emphasized that the Supreme Court had
granted "leeway" for fund fee lawsuits. 311 Shortly thereafter, it quoted Pro-
fessor Birdthistle: "'This isn't just Gartenberg, this is Gartenberg-plus ....
The [C]ourt has reconstructed Gartenberg to emphasize the discrepancy be-
tween retail [individual-investor-oriented] and institutional fees."' 3 8 Head-
ing its story Lower Fees, Courtesy of Supreme Court,379 the Journal submit-
ted: "The new, Gartenberg-plus standard may require firms to inform fund
boards how much they charge other clients and explain the difference in
fees-something critics claim will be hard to do. 38° Indeed, Jones "added a
wrinkle that will put more pressure on fund companies to justify charging
individual investors more than big institutional clients. ' '38' Rob Silverblatt
reported that in Alito's opinion "there's a bit of a twist. '382 Jones delivers
"some wiggle room to investors who claim that certain fee differentials are
abusive. 383 Wrinkle. Twist. Pressure. Investment News headed its page-
one news story High Court Ruling Opens Door for More Lawsuits Over Mu-
tual Fund Fees.3 4 It opened:
While the Supreme Court's ruling last week on a controversial
lawsuit over mutual fund fees was viewed as a huge win by the
mutual fund industry, the decision will likely put more pressure on
the boards and managements of fund companies to defend their
fees and could open the door to even more litigation.
385
Pressure. Hard to do. And Investment News editorialized: "Jones v.
Harris, though a loss for the plaintiffs, might well result in a long-term win
for all mutual fund shareholders, if, as seems likely, it leads fund directors to
376. Taub, supra note 346.
377. Brent Kendall & Daisy Maxey, High Court Gives Leeway for Lawsuits on Fund Fees,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 31,2010, at C1.
378. Sam Mamudi, Lower Fees, Courtesy of Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 2010, at
C15 (alteration in original).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Rob Silverblatt, What the Supreme Court's Decision Means for Fund Investors, FUND
OBSERVER (Mar. 30, 2010), http://money.usnews.comlmoneylblogs/Fund-Observer/2010/
03/30/what -the-supreme-courts-decision-means-for-fund-investors.html.
383. Id.
384. Jessica Toonkel Marquez, High Court Ruling Opens Door for More Lawsuits Over
Mutual Fund Fees, INV. NEWS, Apr. 5-9, 2010, at 1.
385. Id.
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exercise their independence more fully, and this leads to better fund gover-
nance and perhaps lower fees." '386 Lower fees.
According to Gregory Ash, chairman of the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act litigation group at Spencer Fane Britt & Browne LLP:
Now, when these cases are filed, courts are going to have to do a
lot more digging to see if the board of directors and fund manage-
ment fulfilled their fiduciary duties .... If a plaintiff is able to
draft a complaint carefully enough to follow what is essentially a
blueprint laid out in this opinion on how to establish a [legally via-
ble] claim, they will at least get to summary judgment.387
Offers Barry Barbash, a partner in Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP and
former director of the Securities and Exchange Commission Division of In-
vestment Management: "'Fund companies are going to need to be a lot more
analytical with looking at their accounts and fees. . . .A data dump isn't
going to work.' 388 Bear in mind the wisdom of Nobel Laureate Simon: A
data dump conceals, not reveals, an investment adviser's dirty laundry.
Morningstar's Russel Kinnel perceived that the Jones understanding of
critical facets of Gartenberg might hand shareholders a tad more power:
"The [C]ourt also said that boards should examine whether the fees paid are
comparable to those paid by other clients when the services and investment
strategy are comparable., 389 On the other hand, the independent chair of
Investco Ltd.'s mutual fund line, Bruce Crockett, asserted that the contention
that Jones would change the industry presumes that fund boards have not
been looking at different fees, but they have: "I don't see how this changes
much .... Plaintiffs bar will continue to try and find areas to test and fees
will be one of them. 39 °
After the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jones to resolve a split
among the Courts of Appeals concerning what a mutual fund shareholder
must prove to demonstrate that a mutual fund investment adviser had
386. Editorial, Ruling May Benefit Fund Shareholders in the Long Run, INV. NEWS, Apr.
12, 2010, at 8.
387. Marquez, supra note 384. "'With this ruling, a higher standard of conduct has been
placed on mutual fund investment advisers, who help millions of people manage their retire-
ment income.' says Jay Sushelsky, attorney for AARP." John Waggoner, Mutual Fund Fees
Case Goes Back to Lower Court, USA TODAY, Mar. 31, 2010, at B 1.
388. Marquez, supra note 384. Barbash captains the asset management group in Willkie
Farr & Gallagher. Peter Ortiz, SEC Sets Up Fund Investigation Unit, FIN. TIMEs (London),
May 3, 2010, at 6.
389. Kinnel, supra note 129, at 49.
390. Mamudi, supra note 378.
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breached its fiduciary duty as to compensation for services, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit adopted the Gartenberg standard in
Gallus v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc.39' On April 5, 2010, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Gallus, remanding Gallus to the Eighth Circuit for fur-
ther consideration in view of Jones.392 As Professor Birdthistle interpreted
this remand, "It's still difficult to be a plaintiff, but it's easier today that [sic]
it was seven days ago. 393 Then, General Counsel Karrie McMillan of the
Investment Company Institute, a mutual fund industry trade group, opined,
"I don't think the Supreme Court... really changed the way the boards do
things as a practical matter." 394 On the other hand, the Wall Street Journal
reporting on Gallus subheaded its news story: Decisions May Be Making
Suits Easier.3 95
What gap was filled by Justice Alito's Gartenberg-plus opinion in
Jones?
X. WHY THE CRY FOR A GARTENBERG-PLUS OPINION?
A. The Substance of Things Hoped For
The Investment Company Act of 1940 provides in relevant part in sec-
tion 15(a):
It shall be unlawful for any person to serve or act as invest-
ment adviser of a registered investment company, except pursuant
to a written contract, which contract, whether with such registered
company or with an investment adviser of such registered compa-
ny, has been approved by the vote of a majority of the outstanding
voting securities of such registered company, and-
391. 561 F.3d. 816, 817-18, 822 (8th Cir. 2009), vacated by 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010).
392. Ameriprise Fin., Inc. v. Gallus, 130 S. Ct. 2340 (2010). "In a case that American
Funds won in a lower court and that is now on appeal, evidence showed that for at least two
years American refused to tell directors about portfolio managers' incentives." Kinnel, supra
note 129, at 49.
393. Daisy Maxey, High Court Rules Again on Fund Fees, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2010, at
CII.
394. Id.
395. Id. Harvard Law School Professor Jesse Fried, the corporate-governance specialist,
supra note 179, earlier had predicted that a shareholder win in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.,
130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010), would incite plaintiffs' lawyers '"for their own selfish reasons [to]
monitor compensation structures .... That will keep the compensation down .... "' Jess
Bravin & Jane J. Kim, Fees Case Strikes at Heart of Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30,
2009, at C3.
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(1) precisely describes all compensation to be paid thereunder;
(2) shall continue in effect for a period more than two years from
the date of its execution, only so long as such continuance is spe-
cifically approved at least annually by the board of directors or by
vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities of such
company;...
That Act further provides, in relevant part, in section 15(c), that:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any registered investment company hav-
ing a board of directors to enter into, renew, or perform any con-
tract or agreement, written or oral, whereby a person undertakes
regularly to serve or act as investment adviser of or principal un-
derwriter for such company, unless the terms of such contract or
agreement and any renewal thereof have been approved by the
vote of a majority of directors, who are not parties to such contract
or agreement or interested persons of any such party, cast in per-
son at a meeting called for the purpose of voting on such approval.
It shall be the duty of the directors of a registered investment com-
pany to request and evaluate, and the duty of an investment adviser
to such company to furnish, such information as may reasonably
be necessary to evaluate the terms of any contract whereby a per-
son undertakes regularly to serve or act as investment adviser of
396such company.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has prepared Form N-1A,
Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933/Registration State-
ment under the Investment Act of 1940.39' Generally, Form N-IA is for the
use of open-end management companies to register under the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and to offer shares under the Securities Act of 1933.398
The S.E.C. designed it to afford investors information, aiding them to decide
concerning investing in such an investment company. 399 The Registrant is
mandated to reveal the Form N-IA information, which the SEC makes pub-
lic.4" The Commission also may exploit this information "in its regulatory,
disclosure review, inspection, and policy making [functions]."' 4 1
396. 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (2006 & Supp. 111 2010).
397. SEC, FORM N-IA, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn- I a.pdf [herei-
nafter SEC, FORM N-IA].
398. See generally id.
399. Id. at].
400. Id. at 2.
401. Id. at 1.
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Item 27 of Form N-IA is found in Part B thereof: "INFORMATION
REQUIRED IN A STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ' 402
i.e., information additional to that required in a prospectus. The Form N-1A
Item 27 language addressed herein was prepared as a mandatory language in
2004. 03 The SEC was then conscious of specific factors invoked in the Gar-
tenberg Second Circuit opinion toward determining whether an investment
adviser meets section 36(b) fiduciary obligations, including "the adviser-
manager's cost in providing the service, the nature and quality of the service,
the extent to which the adviser-manager realizes economies of scale as the
fund grows larger, and the volume of orders which must be processed by the
manager. ''40 4 In the Gartenberg shareholder derivative challenge to fees paid
a fund adviser, the District Court declared of the unsuccessful challengers of
their fund and its adviser: "Plaintiffs offer as an apt comparison for the
compensation payable by the Fund, the compensation (unspecified) that
pension fund managers are paid which plaintiffs say is only a fraction of the
compensation which the Fund pays. ' '45 So, given the 1940 Act's section
15(c) duty of directors to solicit such data as is reasonably necessary to eva-
luate their investment adviser's contract, and given that the ill-starred Gar-
tenberg plaintiffs had been unarmed with data comparing their adviser's fee
against fees rendered pension fund managers, what disclosures demand the
Commission's Form N-I A?
Item 27(d)(6)(i) provides:
If the board of directors approved any investment advisory con-
tract during the Fund's most recent fiscal half-year, discuss in rea-
sonable detail the material factors and the conclusions with respect
thereto that formed the basis for the board's approval. Include the
following in the discussion:
(i) Factors relating to both the board's selection of the investment
adviser and approval of the advisory fee and any other amounts to
be paid by the Fund under the contract. This would include, but
not be limited to, a discussion of the nature, extent, and quality of
the services to be provided by the investment adviser; the invest-
402. SEC, FORM N-IA, supra note 397, at Part B.
403. See id. at Item 27.
404. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of
Investment Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,798, 39,801 n.31 (June 30, 2004) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 239, 240, 274) (quoting Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d
923, 929 (2d Cir. 1982)).
405. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1044 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), affd by 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
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ment performance of the Fund and the investment adviser; the
costs of the services to be provided and profits to be realized by
the investment adviser and its affiliates from the relationship with
the Fund; the extent to which economies of scale would be realized
as the Fund grows; and whether fee levels reflect these economies
of scale for the benefit of Fund investors. Also indicate in the dis-
cussion whether the board relied upon comparisons of the services
to be rendered and the amounts to be paid under the contract with
those under other investment advisory contracts, such as contracts
of the same and other investment advisers with other registered in-
vestment companies or other types of clients (e.g., pension funds
and other institutional investors). If the board relied upon such
comparisons, describe the comparisons that were relied on and
how they assisted the board in concluding that the contract should
be approved .... 4 06
Such revelations of factors forming the basis for board endorsement of
an investment advisory contract are the things hoped for.
B. The Substance of Things Not Seen
Dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc in Jones, Judge Posner
cited scholarship indicating that the foremost reason for aggravated differ-
ences in advisory fee-levels between equity mutual fund portfolio managers,
and equity pension fund portfolio managers, is that it is in the latter field that
the advisory fees are subject to marketplace arm's-length bargaining. 407
Reassuringly then does Item 27(d)(6)(i) appear, at first glance, geared to post
fund shareholders of how their fund's advisory contract fee measures against
fees paid to the same investment adviser by pension funds or by other institu-
tional advisers: "indicate [in the discussion] whether the board relied upon
comparisons."4 8 At first blush, Item 27(d)(6)(i) seems engineered to notify
fund shareholders of how their fund's board assessed such comparisons "de-
scribe . . . how they assisted the board., 409 Indeed, the Supplementary In-
406. SEC, FORM N-IA, supra note 397, at Item 27(d)(6)(i) (emphasis added).
407. Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731-32 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dis-
senting) (per curiam) (citing John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory
Fees: The Costs of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 634 (2001)).
408. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of
Investment Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,798, 39,801 (June 30, 2004) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 239, 240, 274); SEC, FORM N-I A, supra note 397, at Item 27(d)(6)(i).
409. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of
Investment Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. at 39,802; SEC, FoRM N-IA, supra note 397, at Item
27(d)(6)(i).
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formation with the 2004 Release of the amendatory Final Rule recorded of
this comparison of fees and services provided by the adviser:
410
Several commenters supported the proposed requirement, arguing
that any responsible board would at least seek to compare the
terms of the contract under consideration with relevant terms for
similar funds, and that by encouraging boards to compare the
compensation funds pay to their advisers with the compensation
that other institutional investors pay, there may be a downward
pressure on fund advisory fees.41'
Why then all the shouting in Jones? Remember Investco's Crockett,
who declined to shout, "I don't see how this changes much. 'a2
The Jones fluster arose because real-world boards are not so adequately
responsible as to compare the terms of their own adviser's contract with the
compensation other institutional investors render to that same adviser. These
boards do not so post investors, regarding these matters, in Form N-IA,
which ostensibly is Commission-designed to provide investors data toward
deciding about investing. Therefore, there is no resultant downward pressure
on fund advisory fees. And boards get away with this. How? The cheery,
superficial hints of disclosure by Item 27(d)(6)(i) are belied by the artful
double-negative language of the Commission in its Supplementary Informa-
tion. That passage was drafted to be read by the legal cognoscenti and not
the hapless investors:
As adopted, the amendment requires a description of the compari-
sons upon which the board relied and how they assisted the board
in concluding that the contract should be approved, and does not
require an enumeration of the types of comparisons that the board
413did not use.
Item 27(d)(6)(i) does not require the enumeration of those comparisons
a board did not use.
Shareholders outside the legal or the financial industry, cognoscenti-
perusers of the Federal Register, are not alerted to data not employed to those
shareholders' benefit by their boards: "Little of what the management com-
410. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of
Investment Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. at 39,801.
411. Id. at 39,802.
412. Mamudi, supra note 378.
413. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of
Investment Companies, 69 Fed. Reg. at 39,802.
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pany tells a fund's board or how the board determines fees is in the public
record until a lawsuit is filed. Consequently, investors have to sue first to
find out whether they have a case. 4 14 The retail investors in mutual funds
are not rallied to squeeze fund advisory fees south.
Certain data-assisting investment decision making-which innocent
investors might expect the Securities and Exchange Commission to publish
in Form N-i A exemplify, as St. Paul might preach, things hoped for. True,
some funds such as index funds are comparatively cheaply managed, where-
as others such as international funds are comparatively costly due to unique
hassles or demands for special expertise.415 Nevertheless, the respective in-
vestment advisory fees for mutual funds and for corporate accounts with
identical investments ought to prove identical-whatever the nature of those
potentially diverse underlying investments.416 This is because investment
advisory fees are distinct from those other mutual fund "expenses" properly
charged to the fund shareholders. 417 But a cynical Commission blesses Form
N-1A statements wherein the enumeration of comparisons a board did not
use remain Paul's things not seen. Remember Assistant to the Solicitor Gen-
eral Gannon's pronouncement to Justice Ginsberg that the post-1980 SEC
"has primarily directed its resources and energies into encouraging there to
be better disclosure of fees, both the disclosure of information to the board,
disclosure to investors, better education to shareholders. ' 418 Well, did it?
Fiduciary: from the Latin, fiducia, for trust.419 "Trust can be misplaced. 42 °
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?42 1
414. Kinnel, supra note 129, at 49.
415. Paul S. Atkins, Tort Lawyers Target Mutual Funds, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2009, at
A19.
416. Dan Calabria, Review of Mutual Fund Advisory Fees Is Long Overdue, INV. NEWS,
Nov. 30,2009, at 8.
417. Id.
418. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 277, at 21. The escalating domination over
productive activities in an economy by financial services is dubbed financialization. NINA
BANDEU & ELIZABETH SOWERS, ECONOMY AND STATE: A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 78
(2010). Financial services have skyrocketed to prominence within the American economy.
Id. at 79. And economists concur that the defense of rights in private property is a govern-
ment's duty. Id. at 53. For a free market, unvexed by governmental impediment, ranks
among the most familiar of economic tropes. Id. at I. Nevertheless, a major device whereby
governments do regulate firms is that of consumer protection. Id. at 130. Given this, under
standably might America's consumers trust Congress and its Securities and Exchange Com-
mission to insulate private-property owning investors from the avarice of mutual fund invest-
ment-advisers? Well, do they?
419. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 845 (2002).
420. Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 465,471.
421. Who shall guard the guards themselves? JUVENAL, THE SATIRES OF JUVENAL 247
(London, MacMillian & Co. 1897). The SEC touts a new brain trust focusing on, inter alia,
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XI. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF JONES
A. Flannigan on Fiduciary Duty
Generally, "[E]conomic analysis ... holds little utility for the lex lata"
as understood strictly.42 2 It reveals little of how to interpret the law.423 Yet in
some areas economic analysis might be a portion of the lex lata because legal
rules can be understood to refer to economic concepts.24 The economic lite-
rature concerning agency has swelled phenomenally since the early 1970s. 425
And economists assess opportunism in its every single incarnation.426 The
analysis of opportunism by economists is associated, in the legal community,
with principal/agent commentary.427 Still, very few economists have dared
the economic analysis of fiduciary obligation. Their profession's accom-
plishments are yet to shed much fresh light upon fiduciary accountability.
Economists prodigally have lavished research on economic mechanisms to
control opportunism, yet been skittish in evaluating the primary legal de-
vice.428  Also, there remains no consequential empirical data measuring
whether, as to fiduciary accountability, the conventional loyalty duty is effi-
cient.
investment emphasis and investment advisers. Ortiz, supra note 388. This unit, to be headed
by Robert Kaplan, once an assistant director of the Commission's enforcement division, and
Bruce Karpati, once the assistant regional director for the Commission's New York regional
office, was born of frequent criticisms that the SEC lacks adequate mutual fund industry
knowledge and experience to regulate that business. Id.
422. JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2008).
423. Id.; See, e.g., MARIA MANZANO, MODEL THEORY (Ruy J.G.B. de Queiroz trans.,
1999). "Law is, indeed, applied history. It is not applied economics .... " George Steven
Swan, The Law and Economics of State-Sanctioned Medical Marijuana: Gonzales v. Raich, 7
FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 473, 548 (2006). However, the economic analysis of law can cast
"light upon the inchoate thinking of our forebears." Id.
424. Trachtman cites as examples trade law or competition law. TRACHTMAN, supra note
422, at 3. "Specifically, economic analysis discloses the implicit premises of the law."
George Steven Swan, The Economics of Usury and the Litigation Funding Industry: Ranc-
man v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 753, 784 (2003).
425. Casadesus-Masanell & Spulber, supra note 51, at 87 n.132.
426. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 401-02.
427. Id. at 401.
428. Id. at 409 (citing Oliver Hart, An Economist's View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U.
TORONTO L.J. 299, 299 (1993)).
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1. Production Opportunism
Surely is the loyalty duty, fiduciary accountability, not in opposition to
economic principles.2 9 It transpires that the economic perspective only rep-
licates ancient principle.43° Context determining whether opportunism equals
fiduciary breach,431 Flannigan explains that the context of production is ap-
plied "in its widest sense of shaping human or physical capital for any
end. 432 It encompasses production of exchange just as some firms exist to
broker exchanges.433 Actors undertaking to serve others acquire access to
assets and opportunities connected with their service.434 They can abuse
such access to advance self-interest.435 Mischief is controlled by fiduciary
accountability.
436
2. Exchange Opportunism
Contrast this production opportunism against exchange opportunism.
437
This opportunism occurs between production units at the exchange inter-
face.438 Actors originally agreeing to launch production processes negotiate
the terms of their contributions. 439 For example, a captive mutual fund is
developed by an investment adviser. These firms can permit party actions
affecting renegotiation"---i.e., the renewal of the investment adviser's con-
tract by the captive mutual fund's board of directors. Then may one side be
armed to extract concessions from the other.441 Hypothetically, an invest-
ment adviser bleeds its captive mutual fund. For exchange opportunism aris-
es when actors bargain over their future relationship." 2 Opportunistic con-
tracting in the exchange context is generally nonactionable. 43 This permiss-
ible exchange opportunism is expectable, essentially being competitive be-
429. Id. at 428.
430. Id. at 393.
431. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 394.
432. Id. at 395 n.5.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 394.
435. Id.
436. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 394.
437. Id. at 395.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 395.
442. Id. at 396.
443. Id.
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havior at the negotiation stage.444 This might sound heartening for an in-
vestment adviser like Harris Associates L.P.
Why is this exchange opportunism negotiation to be permitted competi-
tive behavior? Flannigan stated, "As such, it is acceptable for all [of] the
reasons that competition is generally acceptable in market economies., 445 So
in turn, why is competition generally acceptable in market economies?
Competition guarantees alternatives. Those alternatives curb the gross mi-
sallocation of resources by competitive market firms. 446 Sure enough, Justice
Alito in Jones discerned that section 36(b) obtains in light of long term Con-
gressional worry over investment board independence and investment advis-
er recompense.447 The competitive market's alternatives being suppressed in
the captive mutual fund context, the preclusion of fiduciary duty-a preclu-
sion typical of exchange opportunism-proves inapropos. Instead, the at-
tachment of fiduciary duty regarding compensation logically emerges. Sure
enough, Congress in 1970 deputized the individual investor to enforce the
investment adviser's fiduciary duty as in Jones.448
3. Consent
Flannigan further explains that opportunism does not equate with ac-
tionable breach of fiduciary duty if there obtains consent. 4 9 For instance,
parties might consent to the existence of a conflict of interest, although never
to actual self-dealing.45° Compare the situation wherein a manager's firm
might accept an opportunism discount reflective of the risk of opportunism-
so corresponding to the firm's heavier costs of monitoring the shifty manag-
er-but never accept his actual opportunism. This means the parties are al-
lowed to act notwithstanding the managerial conflict of interest, but cannot
allow the conflict to impinge upon managerial decisions. For example, di-
rectors oftentimes are allowed to name their own pay rates.451 Compare the
sway of the investment adviser hypothetically dominating its captive mutual
fund board as to compensation. The upshot will be actionable as a fiduciary
breach if it be proved that the conflicting party did succumb to impermissible
self-regard.452
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Hsiung, supra note 205, at 15.
447. Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1423 (2010).
448. See id.
449. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 399.
450. Id. at 399-400.
451. Id. at 400.
452. Id.
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Consider the post-Jones liability of an investment adviser charging a fee
so outsized as to bear no reasonable relation to services rendered. Flannigan
noted, "Because the existence of [a] conflict is permitted, the burden on the
beneficiary changes from proving the conflict to proving actual self-
interested conduct. 4 53 Sure enough, it is ordained in section 35(b)(1) that
the plaintiff carries the burden of proving investment adviser breach of fidu-
ciary duty.454
4. Limited Access Arrangements
Again, how is the law and economics logic of the Alito opinion such
that Thomas could concur? Flannigan found that various conceptions of
fiduciary responsibility bewilder jurisprudence.455 And Flannigan cautioned
that one snare is the view that fiduciary regulation reaches assessing the fair-
ness of an exercise of "authority, notwithstanding the absence of . . .self-
dealing.''4 6  Such befuddlement plagues this comer of the law.457  Sure
enough, the unbefuddled Justice Alito in Jones recalled that in concocting
the 1970 amendments, Congress rejected an investment adviser compensa-
tion reasonableness standard.458 And the unbefuddled Justice Thomas con-
curred to revile a freewheeling judicial fairness review of fees.459
Make no mistake: "The conventional function of fiduciary regulation is
[controlling the] opportunism [to be found] in limited access arrange-
,,460
ments. Such an arrangement obtains if oneparty acquires access to
another's assets toward a defined or limited goal. The backdrop to con-
ventional fiduciary duty is such arrangement of limited access. 4 62 In agency,
the fiduciary-agent's duty to forgo her self-interest in exploiting the afore-
mentioned limited access is a duty required by definition: For it is this shun-
463ning self-interest that limits the access. Recall Flannigan's insistence re-
453. Id. at 400 n.23.
454. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1) (2006).
455. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 410.
456. Id.
457. Id.
458. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1423 (2010).
459. See id. at 1431 (Thomas, J., concurring).
460. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 393.
461. Flannigan, Fact-Based Fiduciary Accountability in Canada, supra note 57, at 432
n.3.
462. Id. at 443.
463. Id. at 440. "The duty of loyalty is the distinctive feature of fiduciary law-the en-
tailment of the vulnerability of the beneficiary to the fiduciary's discretion in using or working
with a critical resource (such as information) belonging to the beneficiary." HANOCH DAGAN,
THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 236 (2004) (emphasis added) (citing D. Gordon Smith,
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counted in Section VIII C, supra, upon fiduciary duty as a proscription. Pro-
scribed is exploiting limited access in self-interest.
Flannigan's insight-that the conventional function of fiduciary regula-
tion is the control of limited access arrangement-opportunism-isolates the
implicit logic of Alito and Thomas in comprehending the captive mutual
fund-investment adviser duet. Advisers wield discretionary power in an
access sense, in certain aspects.464 Crucially, they enjoy access to the benefi-
ciary's judgment-for nurturance of the beneficiary's judgment is the nature
of advice.465 That function may be exploitable.46 Therein arises the capaci-
ty to exercise a discretion to extract gain beyond that authorized-a de facto
power.467 In this sense proves discretionary power manifestly one of limited
access.
468
More specifically and crucially, the investment adviser enjoys access to
a captive mutual fund board's judgment at least by hypothesis. Therein aris-
es the investment adviser's capacity to extract profit beyond that authorized
to a fiduciary-a de facto power at least by hypothesis. Such was the sin
alleged in Jones against Harris Associates L.P. 469 Therefore could Alito and
Thomas in Jones fuel the enforcement of the investment adviser's fiduciary
duty while heartily disclaiming judicial enforcement of any nebulous reason-
ableness/fairness standard
B. Mirrlees and Frankel on Agency/Fiduciary Duty
In his capacity as a juridical scientist, Judge Easterbrook and his co-
author Fischel fancy the rationale for fiduciary duty as judicial finessing of
impossibly onerous transaction costs 4 70 (as indicated in Section Hll, supra).
Disavowed was the proposition that fiduciary duty redresses informational or
power inequalities between contracting parties.471 Nevertheless, in his own
capacity as a juridical scientist, Judge Posner doggedly insists that the fidu-
ciary principle indeed is the law's reply to the problem of unequal informa-
tion CoStS. 47 2 On the other hand, Flannigan points out that opportunism just
The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1399, 1402, 1404, 1407-
11, 1449 (2002)).
464. Flannigan, Fact-Based Fiduciary Accountability in Canada, supra note 57, at 454.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id. at 455.
468. Id.
469. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1424 (2010).
470. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 42, at 438, 444-46; see also supra Section III
471. Id. at436.
472. POSNER, ECONOMiC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 139, at 114.
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cannot be stamped out through complete contracting with full information.473
Expected repeat interactions dampen opportunism. 474 But agents pursue self-
interest when they spontaneously opt to treat their relation as an end game.475
And markets prove inadequate in addressing end game interactions.
476
1. The Theory of First-Mover Vulnerability
Sir James A. Mirrlees, in 1996, was awarded the Alfred Nobel Memori-
al Prize in Economics 477 "for his work on economic behavior [where] there is
incomplete information. ' 478 The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences hon-
ored Mirrlees, and William Vickery, "for their fundamental contributions to
the economic theory of incentives under asymmetric information.'479 Mir-
rlees' approach notably had proved meritorious in moral hazard situations
like that of principal-agent. 480 Therefore might one presume some Mirrlees
sympathy for Posner's unequal information costs rationale for fiduciary duty,
whether or not one presumed a Mirrlees sympathy for the Easterbrook-
Fischel transaction costs version of the rationale.
However, Mirrlees declares, "It is not so much the asymmetry of infor-
mation that is special about principal-agent relationships, but the asymmetry
of responsibilities, with the principal moving first, the agent following. ' '481
Might this Mirrlees principal-agent finding feed into Jones? True, while
each agent is a fiduciary, not every fiduciary is an agent.482 The Mirrlees
principal first-move insight well might nourish the understanding of Jones.
Boston University School of Law Professor Tamar Frankel is an expert in
fiduciary law,483 in the regulation of money managers, mutual funds, and
473. Flannigan, The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability, supra note 58, at 407. After
all, opportunism ordinarily erupts in violation of the contract. Id. at 406.
474. Id. at 407 n.55.
475. Id. at 407.
476. Id. at415.
477. BANNOCK ET AL., supra note 49, at 275.
478. DIANE COYLE, THE SOULFUL SCIENCE: WHAT ECONOMISTS REALLY DO AND WHY IT
MATTERS 122 (2007).
479. Press Release, Royal Swedish Acad. of Sci., The Prize in Economics 1996 (Oct. 8,
1996), http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/economics/laureates/1 996/press.html).
480. Id.
481. JAMES A. MIRRLEES, WELFARE, INCENTIVES, AND TAXATION 21 (2006).
482. Casadesus-Masanell & Spulber, supra note 51, at 68 (citing Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 42).
483. See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW: ANALYSIS, DEFINITIONS,
RELATIONSHIPS, DUTIES, REMEDIES OVER HISTORY & CULTURES (2008); Tamar Frankel, Fidu-
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advisers,48 and in investment management regulation.485 In August 2009,
Professor Frankel explained that fiduciaries may dispose of, as they like, the
compensation they win for their services:
486
The problem arises when fiduciaries have significant influence on
the amount that they receive as compensation for their services.
This situation occurs when client-entrustors are incapable of [sic:
to] freely and independently agree to the commissions or the fees
for the services. In such cases these commission payments are an
exchange in form but not in substance. The greater the entrust-
ment, the more numerous are the entrustors, the less free bargain-
ing power the entrustors may have. In such cases the law might
interfere in containing the fiduciaries' compensation. This is espe-
cially so when the entrustors will sustain costs in severing the rela-
tionship, for example, pay taxes on amounts that would otherwise
be tax deferred.487
At this juncture, Frankel adds a footnote: "For example, mutual fund
investors are numerous and have no opportunity to negotiate the fees they
charge. Redemption of mutual fund shares invested in a pension fund may
involve for entrustors high taxes. 488
Frankel's mutual fund investors, having-as Mirrlees would say-
moved first by entrusting their retirement money to a mutual fund, expe-
rience no opportunity themselves to negotiate over fees charged. Worse,
they also are hostages vulnerable to costs entailed-e.g., taxes on sums oth-
erwise tax-deferred-in an escape from their agent. Remember Flannigan's
insistence, recounted in Section XI A, supra, that fiduciary regulation checks
the opportunism embedded in limited access arrangements. Not only is an
adviser's discretionary power manifestly a power of limited access abstract-
ly, but also Mirrlees' first-mover mutual fund investors hostage-as Frankel
suggests-to the second-mover adviser, are extraordinarily exposed to op-
portunism.
ciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209 (1995); Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71
CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983).
484. See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY
MANAGERS: MUTUAL FUNDS AND ADVISERS (2d ed. 2001).
485. See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL & CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
REGULATION (3d ed. 2005).
486. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties of Brokers-Advisers-Financial Planners and Money
Managers 8 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-36, 2009) available at
http://www.bu.edullaw/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/2009.html (rev. Feb. 17, 2010).
487. Id. (footnote omitted).
488. Id. at 8 n.29.
2011!]
75
Swan: The Law and aEconomics of Mutual Fund Investment-Adviser Fiduciar
Published by NSUWorks, 2011
NOVA LAW REVIEW
2. The Practice of First-Mover Vulnerability
How closely might the Mirrlees-Frankel logic parallel the facts of
Jones? In the November 2nd oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts shared
this exchange with David C. Frederick, appearing on behalf of the Jones
petitioners:
MR. FREDERICK: Here what is happening is that an arm's-length
transaction for the same services-the same manager is going out
and touting his services to the institutional investor, but simply
charging them half as much money for providing the same portfo-
lio of management.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Do technological changes make a
difference in terms of disclosures required? These days all you
have to do is push a button and you find out exactly what the man-
agement fees are. I mean, you just look it up on Morningstar and
it's right there and you can make-as an investor you can make
whatever determination you'd like, including to take your money
out.
MR. FREDERICK: The fact that an investor may know going in
what the fee is does not address the problem Congress was intend-
ing to address, which is that as larger and larger sums of assets
were accreted to the mutual fund, the investor was not obtaining
the benefits of economies of scale. And that's the central point --
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So we could look at-you know, as
the fund grows bigger and he doesn't get those benefits he can go
look at another fund. It takes 30 seconds.
MR. FREDERICK: And that again doesn't address the problem
Congress was trying to get at, which is to protect the company, not
the individual investor. The individual investor might lessen the
damages that that investor suffers, but the fund, the people remain-
ing, continue to pay excessive fees.
JUSTICE SCALIA: No, but he protects the company ultimately,
because when investors leave the company that is charging exces-
sive fees to go to other companies, the company that they are leav-
ing sees that something's wrong and has to lower its compensation
to its adviser. Why doesn't that affect the company at issue?
MR. FREDERICK: A large number of assets under management
in mutual funds, something like 26 to 35 percent according to ma-
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terials that are in the record, are from 401(k) plans, where the in-
vestor is essentially locked into the fund that his or her company
chooses to make that investment. And even as to investors who
are not locked in, there are significant tax consequences where
over time an investor might be in the Oakmark Fund and have to
suffer large tax consequences in order to get the benefit of the sta-
tute-
489
The mutual-fund, the individual investors therein, moves first. Inves-
tors invest in their mutual fund, which hires an investment-adviser. Thereaf-
ter, those investors fail to net the benefits as increasingly heftier sums accrete
to their fund. The investment-adviser, moving second, now charges these
mutual fund investors double its price to institutional investors, for a compa-
rable portfolio of management. The agent-adviser would lack the funds to
manage had investors not moved first. The Jones facts fit like a glove with
the Mirrless-Frankel logic. Understandably, Frankel responded to Jones,
"'If the industry doesn't do anything in response to this ruling,"' then plain-
tiff investors in captive mutual funds "'will have a better time.'
490
True, individual investors who recoil from being burned can abandon
their flaming investment. Nonetheless, the fund and investor-principals per-
severing in the relationship, who supposedly are legally protected from ad-
viser predation by their adviser's fiduciary duty relative to compensation,
continually pay extreme fees. Correspondingly, when Mirrlees identified the
special component of principal-agent relationships as the principal moving
first and the agent following, Mirrlees emphasized that many economic prob-
lems and possibilities involve the relationship such as taxation, contracts,
bargains, and thefts.49'
C. Jones on Fiduciary Duty
Was it in the spirit of the Ninetieth Congress, delivering investors the
section 36(b) guarantee of security from adviser predation through that ad-
viser's fiduciary duty as to compensation, that the traduced investor should
489. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 277, at 12-14 (emphasis added).
Finally, the contention that shareholders are free to move to another, less costly fund at any
time overlooks two facts:
The initial purchase of a fund probably incurred sales charges, and another charge is like-
ly when buying a different fund. At the same time, the sale of a fund is likely to trigger a taxa-
ble event.
Both factors effectively penalize cost-conscious investors-which is simply unfair.
Calabria, supra note 416, at 8.
490. Mamudi, supra note 378.
491. MIRRLEES, supra note 481, at 21.
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simply sell out? In fact, there is some indication that Congress in the In-
vestment Company Act endeavored to secure the investor-mutual fund rela-
tionship from predatory advisers who could leave scorched investors nothing
but retreat from their mutual fund.492 Such retreat would mean a kind of
marketplace waiver of their statutorily-guaranteed right to their mutual fund
adviser's fiduciary duty in regard to their compensation. Section 47 of the
Act ordains:
(a) Waiver of compliance as void
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to
waive compliance with any provision of this title or with any rule,
regulation, or order thereunder shall be void.
(b) Equitable results; rescission; severance
(1) A contract that is made, or whose performance involves,
a violation of this subchapter, or of any rule, regulation, or order
thereunder, is unenforceable by either party (or by a nonparty to
the contract who acquired a right under the contract with know-
ledge of the facts by reason of which the making or performance
violated or would violate any provision of this subchapter or of
any rule, regulation, or order thereunder) unless a court finds that
under the circumstances enforcement would produce a more equit-
able result than nonenforcement and would not be inconsistent
with the purposes of this subchapter.
(2) To the extent that a contract described in paragraph (1)
has been performed, a court may not deny rescission at the in-
stance of any party unless such court finds that under the circums-
tances the denial of rescission would produce a more equitable re-
sult than its grant and would not be inconsistent with the purposes
of this subchapter.
(3) This subsection shall not apply (A) to the lawful portion
of a contract to the extent that it may be severed from the unlawful
portion of the contract, or (B) to preclude recovery against any
person for unjust enrichment.493
Focusing as Congress did upon equity, did Congress disdain the inves-
tor alternative of selling away her right to her fund adviser's performance of
fiduciary duty? In Jones, the Supreme Court responded to a fiduciary rela-
492. See H.R. Rep. No. 96-1341, at 37 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4800,
4819.
493. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 47(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (2006).
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tionship wherein the first-moving investors could be held hostage-e.g.,
through a threatened taxation of money otherwise tax-deferred-by an inces-
tuous, second-moving mutual fund-investment adviser dyad. Comparison of
the advisory fees charged to captive mutual funds against fees charged to
independent clients had been a concept belittled in the influential Gartenberg
precedent. The Securities and Exchange Commission ostensibly is deputized
to effectuate the Congressional will through championing investors against
investment adviser breach of fiduciary duty. That commission engaged in
double-negative nods and winks to satisfy investment advisers that mutual
fund boards were neither tasked with the study of any captive mutual
fund/independent client fees contrast nor tasked with informing those boards'
own innocent investors that their board had failed to make such comparison.
The Alito opinion in Jones sagely reacted to this pronounced vulnerabil-
ity of the first mover to the second. It fortified the 1970 Act by confirming
that the investment adviser's fiduciary duty therein proves of such import
that Jones: (1) foreclosed the categorical denial of the captive mutual
fund/independent client fees comparison; (2) backed courts away from over-
reliance upon those fees charged to mutual funds by other advisers-the im-
perative behind their warning, spelled out by the Supreme Court advancing
without a single dissent, is that to do so could tend to overly-insulate invest-
ment advisers from section 36(b) liability-and; (3) summoned judicial eval-
uation of a mutual fund board's consideration of the relevant factors behind
the investment advisory fee it approves, the more aggressively for courts to
examine the outcome should a board's consideration be deficient (proce-
dure); and (4) further affirmed the role of the judge in repudiating a fee as
uncalled-for even when negotiated by a board possessed of all relevant in-
formation (substance).4 94 Jones holds that the section 36(b) standard of fidu-
ciary breach excludes the judiciary's second-guessing of informed board
decisions, apparently to be distinguished from simply those decisions deli-
vered by a board advised of the relevant data.4 95 Atop this, Justice Thomas'
concurrence stipulates that the Jones opinion incarnating these features "does
not countenance the free-ranging judicial 'fairness' review, 496 which Con-
gress definitively discarded in 1970.
494. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1428-29 (2010).
495. Id. at 1430-31.
496. Id. at 1431 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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XII. CONCLUSION
A. The Law and Economics of Litigation
The preceding discussion has reviewed the 2010 Jones v. Harris Asso-
ciates L.P. Supreme Court opinion by Justice Alito. It beckoned future law-
suits brought by mutual fund shareholders challenging the fees paid to the
investment advisers of their funds. Such advisers erect the captive mutual
funds they then advise and dominate. The Investment Company Act of
1940, as amended in 1970, laid upon the investment adviser of a registered
investment company a fiduciary duty as to that adviser's services compensa-
tion laid out by such company. The extent, or even the existence, of private,
plaintiff-driven litigation to enforce federal enactments is in great measure
the outcome of Congressional choice among options of statutory design.497
Large-scale Congressional interventions into the marketplace can pivot, in-
stead, upon bureaucratic enforcement regimes, entailing administrative in-
vestigations, hearings, and issuance of orders. 49
The model of rational litigant behavior as developed in the literature of
law and economics hearkens to a plaintiffs expected monetary benefit (EB),
expected litigation costs (EC), probability of victory (p), and the perceived
claim's consequent monetary value (EV).4 99 These variables impinge like-
wise, of course, upon her for-profit sector attorney's evaluation of his case.5"
Exploiting this law and economics formula for the litigation decision (EV =
EB(p)-EC) illuminates systematically the means whereby Congress can regu-
late the volume of private enforcement litigation. Congress twists the vo-
lume-dials by manipulating the anticipated dollar payoff from lawsuits. °1
497. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 3 (2010); see, e.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE
AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001); R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING
WELFARE RIGHTS (1994); R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE
CLEAN AIR ACT (1983); THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE
BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (2004).
498. FARHANG, supra note 497, at 3.
499. Id. at 22.
500. See id. at 23-24.
501. Id. at 25. Farhang analyzes from the perspective of new institutionalism in political
science, in his stress upon political/strategic/policy forces impelling statutory design out-
comes. Id. at 24. These variables can explain the resultant nativity of a statute that is quite
inefficient economically. FARHANG, supra note 497, at 24. In any event, the new institutio-
nalism emergent a generation ago, see, e.g., James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, The New
Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 AM. POL. Soi. REV. 734 (1984),
the dominant political science approach since 1990, MARK BEVIR & R.A.W. RHODES, THE
STATE AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 25 (2010), and now the leading expression of modernist-
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And Jones arrived at the Supreme Court only following dueling in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by such swashbucklers of
law and economics as Chief Judge Frank H. Easterbrook and Judge Richard
A. Posner.
B. Jones Steers America A right
Gartenberg, an opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, so read the fiduciary duty feature of the 1970 amendments
that subsequent litigation in exorbitant fee controversies elicited judgments
nearly uniformly for defendants. Thereafter, economic analysis of law hea-
vyweights Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fishel propounded that naught special
adheres to the fiduciary relationship. Fiduciary duty is instead a transaction-
cost function. In Jones, Chief Judge Easterbrook reacted to an attack under
the amendments to the Investment Company Act from shareholders in mu-
tual funds against their captive funds' adviser's recompense. His opinion
hearkened virtually altogether to the feature of the fiduciary adviser's disclo-
sure to its captive mutual fund's board. Both the intermediate-court appel-
late opinions in Gartenberg and Jones snorted at respective plaintiff pushes
to benchmark investment advisory fees levied upon their captive mutual
funds against fees imposed on independent clients, e.g., pension funds. In
dissenting from a Jones denial of a rehearing en banc, Judge Posner concen-
trated rather upon an adviser's charging its captive funds over twice what it
charged to independent funds.
The Alito opinion opted less for the Easterbrook rationale in Jones than
for the Gartenberg route. To run the risk of liability for its breach of fidu-
ciary duty, the investment adviser must amass compensation so disproportio-
nately great as to entail no reasonable relation to the rendered services: the
fee cannot be the fruit of an arm's-length bargain. Yet Alito gives birth to a
Gartenberg-plus opinion. Jones disavows any categorical rule bar against
comparisons between those fees an adviser levies upon a captive mutual fund
and fees it charges its independent clients. Justice Alito expounds that fees
can be excessive even when negotiated by a board in possession of all rele-
vant information.
Comprehended at once by numerous commentators was the potential
impact of Alito's Gartenberg-plus opinion in Jones. The bottom line: There
might be mounting pressure on the investment advisers of captive mutual
empiricism, id. at 79, in 2011 confronts challenge from alternative theories of the state. See id.
at 198.
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fund boards to make detailed accountings of, and perhaps reductions of, their
investment advisory charges. Any such pressure would redound to the fi-
nancial benefit of retail rather than to institutional investors. Disappointing-
ly, such salutary payoffs as might be hoped-for from Jones had not already
been laid on the table for investors by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion. The naive might believe themselves watched-over by a benign, guar-
dian-angel S.E.C. But that blind administrative-watchdog slumbers.
This Alito opinion in Jones snugly squares with the law and economics
thinking posited neither by Easterbrook-with a linking of fiduciary duty
with transaction costs-nor by Posner, who ties the fiduciary duty to the un-
equal information costs problem. It rather comports with contributions of
Nobel laureate economist Sir James A. Mirrlees, and of the fiduciary law
scholar Tamar Frankel of Boston University. The former comprehends the
distinguishing element of principal-agent relationships to be asymmetry in
responsibilities, with the principal as first mover and the agent as the second.
Frankel perceives that first mover-mutual fund investors (principals) might
become hostages of the lupine second mover-investment advisers (agents).
The Jones advance beyond Gartenberg is probably, if tenuously, for the
best from a libertarian perspective. As the law and economics scholar and
expert in the law of fiduciary duty Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos 50 2 frames it:
[Clontracting parties cannot create levels of fiduciary obligations
outside the two choices: arm's-length or fiduciary relations. That
is, parties cannot agree to give the investor fewer opportunities
than a pure arm's-length relationship or more opportunities than a
pure fiduciary relationship. The farther apart the legal system
keeps the definitions of the two, the more latitude parties have to
fine-tune their relationships. In order to expand contracting choic-
es, the two levels of loyalty available must be kept as far apart as
possible.5 °3
At least as a general principle, free market contracting must welcome
strong enunciations of fiduciary duty."
502. See, e.g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Meinard v. Salmon and the Economics of
Honor, 1999 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 137, 137.
503. Id. at 153.
504. Also, even acclaimed scholars of law and economics can assert that a widely-sensed
impulse of conscience, and not merely some presumably-widespread application of cost-
benefit analysis, see, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit
Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105 (2000), properly is to be
heeded by the architects of legal frameworks. See generally LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING
CONSCIENCE: How GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE (2011).
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